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I. INTRODUCTION 
From medical1 to patent2 to tort cases,3 the use of information from the 
natural sciences and from technical disciplines pervades many areas of 
adjudication.4 Scientific organizations encourage their members to 
participate in the adjudication process by providing scientific and technical 
information to courts through amicus curiae briefs,5 and by serving as 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., right-to-die cases such as Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); 
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.  261 
(1990). 
 2. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (seeking 
damages under the doctrine of equivalents for a patent infringement by a competitor’s ultrafiltration 
method); Lotus Dev’t Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (regarding the patentability of a 
computer program’s memo command hierarchy). 
 3. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (seeking recovery for 
birth defects allegedly produced by use of the drug Bendectin during a mother’s pregnancy). 
 4. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law and Politics, 11 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3-4 n.9 (1993) (describing various areas of adjudication which involve 
science); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 97 (Apr. 2, 1990) (“Economic, statistical, 
technological, and natural and social scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both 
routine and complex litigation.”). 
 5. Literally, amicus curiae brief means a brief filed by a friend of the court. BLACK ’S LAW 
DICTIONARY  107 (4th ed. 1968). A friend of the court is a by-stander  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/3
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court-appointed experts. For instance, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Sciences founded the Court Appointed Scientific Experts 
Project in 1998 to “assist federal district judges to obtain independent 
scientific and technical experts.”6 Law professors have advocated this 
project as a way to “help[] courts get it right.”7  
Justice Stephen Breyer addressed the increasing importance of 
scientific and technical information in U.S. Supreme Court cases at an 
annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science.8 He noted that amici participation in such cases play “important 
role[s] in educating the judges on potentially relevant technical matters,” 
thus helping to improve the quality of the Court’s decisions.9 As an 
example, he described how the discussion of pain control technology10 in 
 
 
who interposes and volunteers information upon some matter of law in regard to which the 
judge is doubtful or mistaken; or upon some matter of which the court may take judicial 
cognizance. Implies friendly intervention . . . to remind court of legal which has escaped its 
notice, and regarding which it appears to be in danger of going wrong. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 6. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE , CASE Mainpage, at 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2000). See also Mark S. Frankel, The 
Role of Science in Making Good Decisions, American Association for the Advancement of Science, at 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/sfrl/projects/testim/mftest.htm (June 10, 1998) (urging scientists and 
engineers to inform courts about the scientific issues involved in cases and arguing that the nature of 
the adversarial system often does not allow the parties “to enlighten either judges or juries about the 
validity of a scientific methodology or of the conclusions drawn from disparate data”). 
 7. Lee Siegel, The Judicial System Needs Your Expertise, Law Professor Tells Physicists, SALT 
LAKE T RIB., Mar. 23, 2000, at C2 (quoting Professor Susan Poulter’s address at the annual meeting of 
the American Physical Society). See also  Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Really Going On?” A Study of 
Lawyer and Scientist Inter-Disciplinary Discourse, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 181, 205-06 
(1999) (arguing for scientists and lawyers to work together to bring scientific information to courts and 
legislators). 
 8. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24 (1998). 
 9. Id. at 26. See also Science in Court, WASH . POST, Feb. 19, 1998, at A16; Thomas G. Field, 
Jr., Letters, Scientific Evidence and the Courts, 262 SCIENCE 1629, 1629-30 (1993) (urging the 
scientific community to invest more resources in to developing useful materials for courts). Cf. Ellie 
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 197 (2000) (exploring the use of “legislative facts” such as scientific and empirical studies in 
appellate litigation); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial 
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988) (arguing that the Court has 
increasingly relied on legislative facts, including scientific facts, after the beginning of the twentieth 
century). 
 10.  The availability of methods to control pain was of crucial concern to the Court in Washington 
v. Glucksberg , where the Court addressed the constitutionality of a state statute banning assisted 
suicide. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Because the Court noted that “many people who request physician-
assisted suicide withdraw that request if their depression and pain are treated,” the Court was 
understandably concerned with the availability of methods to lessen the pain felt by and manage the 
symptoms of patients with severe illnesses. See id. at 730. Amici opposed to the statute discussed the 
chronic and acute pain felt by many terminally ill patients, while amici writing in support of the 
statute, such as the American Medical Association, noted the availability of pharmacological methods 
other than heavy sedation or anesthesia to lessen the pain of those patients. See, e.g., Brief for Julian 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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various amicus briefs helped the Justices to “identify areas of technical 
consensus and disagreement.”11 
This paper examines the participation of medical, scientific, and 
technical organizations, as well as individuals in a medical, scientific , or 
technical capacity, as amici before the Supreme Court. This examination is 
limited to organizations’ and individuals’ participation as parties on 
amicus curiae briefs.12 Part II discusses the general role of amici before the 
Supreme Court, as well as scientific and technical information currently 
presented to the Court. This Part then briefly introduces and critiques the 
Court’s use of scientific and technical information as “legislative facts”—
legally significant facts that transcend a particular dispute yet are still 
relevant to the legal reasoning involved in the dispute—providing 
examples of cases where the Court has used “legislative facts” both inside 
and outside the context of science.13 This Part argues that there are two 
reasons why the scientific and technical amici participation is important 
when the Supreme Court adjudicates in technical and scientific areas. 
First, the information and expertise—especially regarding the scientific 
process as well as particular scientific facts—provided by scientific and 
technical amici are necessary for the Court to appreciate fully the 
consequences at stake in a particular case. Second, the information and 
their expertise are necessary for the public to contextualize the Court’s 
rulings. 
Part III describes what parties are considered scientific or technical 
amici within the scope of this paper, and lays out the methodology used to 
conduct research on those parties’ amicus briefs. Part IV explores actual 
amicus curiae briefs of medical, scientific, and technical amici. This Part 
addresses the characteristic factors examined for each amici participant 
and each amicus brief and also presents the results of this study of ninety-
two medical, scientific, and technical organizations and individuals that 
have been amici before the Supreme Court in the last decade. Particularly, 
this study exposes the relative predominance of medical organizations as 
 
 
M. Whitaker, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 98-110), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 
(No. 95-1858); Brief for the American Medical Association et al., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (No. 95-1858). 
 11. Breyer, supra note 8, at 26. 
 12. This paper, however, does recognize that amici often participate in other ways, such as 
commenting on briefs and mooting parties.  
 13. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942) (characterizing two types of evidentiary facts—
legislative and adjudicative—and distinguishing legislative facts from adjudicative facts as facts within 
the province of the trier of fact to decide). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/3
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amici and the relative absence of medical, scientific and technical amici in 
environmental cases. 
Part V of this paper then considers possible explanations for the 
disparity between medical, scientific, and technical amici participation. 
These explanations include the nature of the Supreme Court docket and 
varying levels of attorney familiarity with scientific and technical amici. 
The relative absence of scientific and technical amici in environmental 
cases is especially notable because environmental cases have similar 
characteristics to health and medical cases in which the Court found 
scientific and technical, as well as medical amici participation useful. 
Consequently, this paper addresses the value that scientific and technical 
organizations add as amici in environmental cases. In particular, it 
examines the role that they did play in informing the Court about scientific 
issues in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA,14 as well as 
additional roles that they could have played. In American Trucking, amici 
briefs by scientific organizations will aid the Court by presenting critical 
information about the nature of risk assessment, although more 
participation would have been helpful for the Court’s full resolution of the 
scientific issues involved.15 
Part VI concludes that scientific and technical amici can participate in 
ways valuable to the Court when the dispute allows these amici to present 
information relevant to their technical or scientific expertise. Because 
environmental cases frequently involve scientific and technical matters,16 
this paper urges scientific and technical organizations to increase their 
participation as amici in these cases to enable the Court to maintain a 
consistent level of informed decision making in all environmental cases 
involving scientific and technical issues. 
 
 
 14. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev. denied in part, granted in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), petition for cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257), cross-petition 
granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426) (regarding the constitutionality of EPA 
setting standards for nonthreshold pollutants). 
 15. The Federal Judicial Center defines risk assessment as the “approach increasingly used by 
regulatory agencies to estimate and compare the risks of hazardous chemicals and to assign priority for 
avoiding their adverse effects.” See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 412 (2d ed. 2000).  
 16. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
181, 187 n.24 (1999) (noting that “many environmental programs owe their birth, if not their entire 
existence, to scientific consensus—developed through numerous, diverse studies—regarding a causal 
relationship between types of human activity and resulting environmental degradations”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Amicus Participation 
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the percentage of cases with amici 
participation rose from thirty-five percent in the 1965-1966 term17 to 
eighty-two percent in the 1987-1988 term,18 and to over ninety percent in 
the 1995-1996 term.19 Participants included special interest organizations, 
parties in similar cases, government agencies, affected individuals, law 
professors in specialized fields, and various levels of bar associations.20 
Bruce Ennis, an experienced U.S. Supreme Court advocate, has described 
three major categories of effective amici participation and amicus curiae 
briefs.21 First, effective amici briefs may help flesh out legal arguments 
that the parties are forced to make in abbreviated form.22 Second, they may 
present arguments that the parties feel reluctant to make for strategic 
reasons.23 Third, they may inform the Court of broader legal and policy 
implications of a ruling.24 Both Ennis and other commentators have noted 
that amicus curiae briefs are more persuasive when they present facts and 
arguments that the Court would not have received from the parties 
themselves.25 Otherwise, the briefs serve only as “me-too” documents.26 
Indeed, a recent comprehensive study of Supreme Court amicus briefs 
 
 
 17. See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH . U. L. REV. 603 (1984). 
 18. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE  564 (7th ed. 1993). 
 19. See Susan J. Becker, Amicus Filings on the Rise, 23 LITIG. NEWS, July 1998, at  3. 
 20. See Reagan Wm. Simpson, How to Be a Good Friend to the Court: Strategic Use of Amicus 
Briefs, 28 BRIEF 38, 39 (1999). 
 21. See Ennis, supra  note 17, at 606-08. 
 22. See id.  
 23. See id.  
 24. See id.  
 25. See Mary-Christine Sungaila, Effective Amicus Practice Before the United States Supreme 
Court: A Case Study, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 187, 189 (1999) (noting that an amicus 
should “supplement, rather than duplicate, the party’s brief”); Ennis, supra  note 17, at 608 (“It is an 
improper use of the amicus role, and an imposition on the Court, to file a ‘me too’ amicus brief.”). 
 26. Supreme Court Rule 37.1 states: 
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court revelent matter not already 
brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus 
curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored. 
S. CT. R. 37.1 (emphasis added). See also Ennis, supra  note 17, at 608 (arguing that filing a “me too” 
brief constitutes an imposition on the Court); Simpson, supra note 20, at 43 (arguing that amicus briefs 
should “never simply repeat arguments made by the parties”); Sungaila, supra note 25, at 189 (arguing 
that amici should resist the temptation to say little more than “me too”); Alexander Wohl, Friends with 
Agendas, 82 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 46, 48 (quoting William L. Robinson, chair of the ABA Standing 
Committee on Amicus Curiae Briefs, who states that “[a] large number of amicus briefs just don’t 
have anything special to say beyond what the parties are saying,” to argue that most amicus briefs are 
ineffective). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/3
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found that amicus briefs have a statistically significant effect on the 
Court’s decision making, especially when they present “new 
information—legal arguments and background factual material—that 
would be relevant to persons seeking the correct result in light of 
established legal norms.”27 
Scientific and technical amici may be the best parties to present the 
third category of effective briefs outlined by Ennis. The unique 
perspectives, facts, and arguments of scientific disciplines can inform the 
Court of the broader legal and policy implications of its rulings. For 
instance in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Court held that 
federal trial judges must be gatekeepers for the admission of scientific 
evidence, citing to three amicus briefs filed on behalf of groups of 
scientists.28 In Daubert, the Court found it necessary to decide how to 
determine what constitutes “scientific knowledge under Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702.”29 Rule 702 provided for admission of expert testimony 
“[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact . . . .”30 The central question was whether a “general 
acceptance” rule would determine the admission of scientific evidence or 
if the trial judge would play a broader gatekeeping role when admission of 
expert testimony is sought under Rule 702.31 
Groups of individual scientists filed two amicus briefs,32 and the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science filed a third amicus 
brief cited by the Supreme Court in Daubert.33 Of the twenty-two amicus 
briefs filed in the case, most of them provided information on matters such 
 
 
 27. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. P A. L. REV. 743, 748 (2000). In particular, Kearney and Merrill’s study 
examined all Supreme Court decisions from the 1946-1947 term to t he 1995-1996 term and classified 
the outcomes and amicus participation in 6141 cases. The study categorized the number of amicus 
briefs supporting the petitioner, respondent, or neither party. Notably, the study found that the amicus 
briefs supporting respondents were more successful than the amicus briefs supporting the petitioner. 
See id. at 816-17. The study also reported that cited briefs did not have a greater success rate than 
noncited amicus briefs. See id. at 811-12. Finally, the study found that “repeat players” who 
consistently filed high-quality amicus briefs, such as the ACLU and the AFL-CIO, were more 
successful than the average amicus brief filer. See id. at 813-15, 819.  
 28. See 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 29. Id. at 589-90. 
 30. See id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 31. See id. at 588. See also id. at 579 (describing the “general acceptance” rule as a rule that 
would exclude expert opinion based on a scientific technique if that technique were not “generally 
accepted” as reliable within the relevant scientific community). 
 32. See id. at 590 (citing Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al., as amicus curiae); id. at 596 
(citing Brief for Ronald Bayer et al., as amicus curiae). 
 33. See id. at 590 (citing Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al., 
as amicus curiae). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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as definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific validity, and peer 
review.34 These briefs certainly seemed important to the Justices 
formulating the majority opinion.35 Even though Justice Rehnquist, in his 
dissent, acknowledged the information in the amicus briefs as “far afield 
from the expertise of judges,”36 he nevertheless wrote, “[t]his is not to say 
that such materials[, the amicus briefs,] are not useful or even necessary in 
deciding how Rule 702 should be applied . . . .”37 
Notably, many of the amicus briefs in Daubert discuss meta-science—
the scientific method and process of scientific research—rather than 
particular scientific determinations. This is also true in Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael38 and General Electric Co. v. Joiner,39 two subsequent cases 
involving the admissibility of expert testimony in which the Court cited 
extensively to briefs by scientific amici. In Daubert, descriptions of the 
nature of science as “not an encyclopedic body of knowledge . . . [but 
rather] a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about 
the world that are subject to further testing and refinement”40 allowed the 
majority to reject the use of a “general acceptance” test for the admission 
of scientific evidence and instead assign the gatekeeping role to the trial 
judge for assessing the admission of scientific expert testimony. Indeed, 
scientific and technical amici may be most helpful to the Court in disputes 
that implicate the procedural aspects of science rather than substantive 
scientific determinations because such meta-scientific information is less 
akin to “facts” ordinarily left to the determination of the trial court and 
more related to the establishment of legal rules.41 
Finally, scientific and technical organizations possess the credibility to 
present such information, both about the methodology of science and 
about substantive scientific determinations. Among the general public, 
both physicians and scientists rate among the highest of all professional 
groups with respect to public esteem.42 In addition, both the Court43 and 
 
 
 34. See id. at 588. 
 35. Id. at 590, 596-97.  
 36. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598-99 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 37. Id. at 599. 
 38. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 39. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 40. Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National 
Academy of Sciences, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (No. 92-102). 
 41. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (creating guidelines to determine whether expert evidence 
constitutes “scientific knowledge” (for example, whether it has been tested in the scientific 
community, whether it has been subjected to peer review, its known or potential rate of error, and its 
“general acceptance”), and to support the use of these guidelines as factors instead of gatekeeping 
tests, the Court cited to authorities presented by the amici themselves). 
 42. See Andrew Lawler, Support for Science Stays Strong, 272 SCIENCE 1256, 1256 (1996) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/3
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the public perceive science, as well as scientific groups, as “neutral,”44 
regardless of whether or not this is actually the case.45 Therefore, the Court 
may be more receptive to scientific information presented by scientific 
amici in their briefs. 
B. Venturing Afield: The Use of and Call for More Empirical Scientific 
Material in Judicial Decision Making 
By the time a legal dispute reaches appellate review, triers below have 
already made factual determinations regarding the dispute. Therefore, 
when scientific and technical amici brief the Court on information 
regarding science or the nature of science, they present different types of 
facts, categorized by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis as legislative facts.46 
Professor Davis defines legislative facts as significant facts relevant to the 
legal reasoning in the resolution of an adjudicated dispute but which 
transcend the particular dispute itself.47 In this way, adjudicated facts that 
 
 
(noting that “leaders in the scientific community rank second only to physicians in public esteem”). 
 43. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1998) (accepting risk assessment based 
on “medical or other objective, scientific evidence”) (emphasis added). 
 44. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 928 n.8 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evidence, in 
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 37 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 1981) (“[Lay jurors] tend to 
assume [scientific evidence] is more accurate and objective than lay testimony.”)). See also BERTRAND 
RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 494 (1945) (“Unlike religion, [science] is ethically 
neutral: it assures men that they can perform wonders, but does not tell them what wonders to 
perform.”); Samuel J. McNaughton, What Is Good Science?, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 513, 514 
(1999) (arguing that objectivity in execution is a standard of good science, but recognizing that all 
science is not “good”); cf. DAVID COLLINGRIDGE & COLIN REEVE , SCIENCE SPEAKS TO POWER: THE 
ROLE OF EXPERTS IN POLICY MAKING 34 (1986) (arguing that occasionally “science is used to 
legitimate or rationalize political choices which have already been taken”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss 
& Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 338, 345 (1992) (“[I]n its 
promises of neutrality, predictability, and certainty, science holds extraordinary appeal for the legal 
system.”); Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability of Genetic Information, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2125-26 (1994) (“[I]t is . . . comforting [to the public] to believe that there is 
definitive, science-based information relevant to understanding and resolving social problems.”).  
 45. See Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have “Neutral” Rule 706 
Experts? , 1998 DET. C.L. MICH . ST. U.L. REV. 927 (questioning the neutrality of scientific experts); 
Howard A. Denemark, The Search for “Scientific Knowledge” in Federal Courts in the Post-Frye 
Era: Refuting the Assertion that “Law Seeks Justice While Science Seeks Truth,” 8 HIGH TECH L.J. 
235 (1993) (discussing whether the goals of law and science are distinct); Michael S. Jacobs, Testing 
the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror 
“Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083 (1993) (arguing that scientific 
objectivity cannot be assumed); Carl B. Meyer, Science and Law: The Quest for the Neutral Expert 
Witness. A View from the Trenches, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35 (1996-1997) (examining 
bias in scientific experts); Ned Miltenberg, Myths about “Neutral” Scientific Experts, 36 TRIAL, Jan. 
2000, at 62 (critiquing assumptions about scientific experts).  
 46. See Davis, supra  note 13, at 402-03. 
 47. Id. at 402. In the context of constitutional interpretation, Professor David Faigman refined the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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are within the province of the trial court are distinguished from legislative 
facts which can be considered and used by courts of review. Some 
scholars argue that the Court rarely relies on such information for decision 
making purposes, but limits it to rhetorical use.48 Others accept that the 
Court does rely on such information for decision making purposes but 
argue against the normative linking of adjudicative rights to potential 
fluxes in scientific evidence.49 
Scientific information can underly legislative factfinding. For instance, 
Justice Breyer noted that the extent to which medical technology reduces 
the risk of dying in severe pain underlies the answer to whether the right to 
assisted suicide is a constitutional liberty.50 Similarly, medical information 
concerning the nature of mental illness underlies the determination of 
whether public safety can justify indefinite noncriminal confinement.51 
Further Justice Breyer’s recent opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart illustrates 
the value of this input from medical, scientific, and technical amici to the 
Court.52 Stenberg involved a challenge to Nevada’s ban on “partial birth” 
abortions as lacking any exception to preserve the health of the mother and 
as unconstitutionally burdening the woman’s ability to choose a certain 
type of abortions procedure.53 Justice Breyer treated the presence of 
medical amici in support of both the petitioner and the respondent54 as 
 
 
category of legislative facts into two subcategories: (1) “constitutional-rule” facts which support a 
particular interpretation of the Constitution and (2) “constitutional-review” facts which are used under 
the pertinent constitutional rule to determine the constitutionality of a particular action. See Faigman, 
infra  note 48, at 553. These categories can be generalized to any form of legislative review by 
redesignating them legislative-rule facts and legislative-review facts.  
 48. See, e.g., Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 
111 (1997) (arguing that in American culture, where legitimacy is accorded to scientific findings, the 
Court recites scientific facts only to demonstrate that its rulings are in accord with such findings). Cf. 
David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding:” Exploring the Empirical Component of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. P A. L. REV. 541, 549 (1991) (citing critiques of the Supreme 
Court’s use of “empirical research when it fits the Court’s particular needs”). Professor Faigman 
makes an alternative critique to the Court’s use of scientific information. In addition to charging that 
science is used rhetorically, he argues that the Court treats scientific information as a “matter of 
normative legal judgment rather than a separate inquiry aimed at information gathering.” Id. 
 49. Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
Inc., is a prime example of this critique. 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that links to medical technology has set the Court “on a collision course with itself”). 
 50. See Breyer, supra  note 8, at 24-25. 
 51. Id. at 25. 
 52.  120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (2000) (upholding a challenge to the constitut ionality of the Nebraska 
statute banning “partial birth” abortion). 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  See, e.g., Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al., Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830) (supporting respondents challenging the statute); Brief 
for the American Civil Liberties Union and Various Medical Doctors, Stenberg (No. 99-830) 
(supporting respondents challenging the statute); Brief for Association of American Physicians and 
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having informative value. After discussing the medical information 
presented by these amici, he noted: 
[T]he division of medical opinion about [the dilation and extraction 
method] at most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the 
presence of risk, not its absence. That division here involves highly 
qualified knowledgeable experts on both sides of the issue. Where a 
significant body of medical opinion believes a procedure may bring 
with it greater safety for some patients and explains the medical 
reasons supporting that view, we cannot say that the presence of a 
different view by itself proves the contrary. Rather, the uncertainty 
means a significant likelihood that those who believe that [the 
dilation and extraction method] is a safer abortion method in certain 
circumstances may turn out to be right. If so, then the absence of a 
health exception will place women at an unnecessary risk of tragic 
health consequences. If they are wrong, the exception will simply 
turn out to have been unnecessary.55 
Not all Justices rely on scientific information as legislative facts, 
however, nor are all as receptive to the use of empirical research as Justice 
Breyer. For instance, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health  expressed explicit disapproval of 
the linkage between the constitutional framework for abortion regulation 
in Roe v. Wade and the state of medical technology.56 Also, Justice 
Rehnquist has dismissed the presentation of social science studies 
demonstrating a jury’s bias towards sentencing a defendant to death as 
only marginally relevant to the constitutionality of a defendant’s 
conviction.57  
The reluctance of some Justices and judges to incorporate scientific 
information in the development of their legal opinions may derive from 
their unfamiliarity with these disciplines. For example, in advocating for 
specialized courts to hear patent cases, Judge Henry Friendly argued that 
the patent cases dealing with the higher reaches of science are often “quite 
beyond the ability of the usual judge to understand without the expenditure 
of an inordinate amount of educational effort by counsel and of attempted 
 
 
Surgeons et al., Stenberg (No. 99-830) (supporting petitioners seeking to uphold the statute). See also 
Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 511 (D. Neb. 1997) (noting that both parties have stipulated to a 
part of AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF T RUSTEES ON LATE-TERM 
ABORTION (1997)). 
 55.  Stenberg , 120 S. Ct. at 2612-13. 
 56. Akron, 462 U.S. at 458. 
 57. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-71 (1986). 
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self-education by the judge, and in many instances, even with it.”58 
Nevertheless, Justice Harry Blackmun, and now Justice Breyer, have 
urged researchers to present additional empirical findings to the Court.59 
Justice Brennan has emphasized the compelling effect that empirical 
findings can have as well. For instance, in United States v. Leon, Justice 
Brennan noted in his dissent that the Court might not have created a good-
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s rule to exclude evidence 
obtained from unlawful searches or seizures had empirical research refuted 
the Court’s assumption that a good-faith exception would not affect 
deterring constitutional violations by the police.60 By noting that the 
constitutionality of the good-faith exception could again be challenged in 
light of additional empirical research, Brennan implicitly urged social 
scientists to research the relationship between good-faith exceptions and 
the deterrence of unconstitutional police searches and seizures.  
Although the Court’s reception of empirical research is mixed,61 the 
fact that some Justices consider such research useful, and even persuasive, 
should motivate scientific and technical researchers to present such 
information to the Court. Only by doing so can researchers shape the 
Justices’ perceptions of the scientific context of their decisions. Moreover, 
 
 
 58. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 157 (1973). See also  
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System , 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1111 (1990) (discussing asserted reasons for the establishment of specialized courts, such as patent 
claims courts, but arguing that the creation of specialized courts not subject to generalist review should 
be avoided because the isolation of particular types of cases within specialized court systems interferes 
with the coherence of federal law as a whole). 
 59. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text; see generally Steven R. Schlesinger & Janet 
Nesse, Justice Harry Blackmun and Empirical Jurisprudence, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 405, 406 (1980) 
(describing Blackmun’s use of scientific data in his formulation of legal opinions). Blackmun’s use of 
and receptivity to scientific information probably derived from his background in medical-legal 
matters. See Ann Alpers, Justice Blackmun and the Good Physician: Patients, Populations, and the 
Paradox of Medicine, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 41, 53-54 (1998) (attributing Justice Blackmun’s 
“lead[ing] of American medical philosophy” in part to the “happy decade he spent as general counsel 
to the Mayo Clinics and Association” as well as to his long-time fascination with Hippocrates); Gregg 
Orwoll, Harry Andrew Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (1994) (discussing Blackmun’s 
practice at the Mayo Clinic as Resident Counsel). 
 60. 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984). 
 61. Professor Faigman categorizes the Supreme Court’s use of empirical evidence into four 
categories: (1) application—when the Court correctly applies available empirical evidence towards the 
development of its conclusions; (2) misapplication—when the Court uses empirical research, but 
misapplies it to its determinations; (3) nonincorporation—when the Court acknowledges the validity, 
relevancy, and importance of available empirical evidence but fails to find it conclusive enough to 
alter its holdings; and (4) dismissal—when the Court dismisses empirical evidence entirely, either as 
invalid, irrelevant, or unimportant. See Faigman, supra  note 48, at 550. See also Hashimoto, supra 
note 48 (arguing that even the Court’s apparent acceptance of scientific findings may not constitute 
actual acceptance, as the Court recites scientific facts merely to demonstrate that its rulings are in 
accord with such findings). 
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when the briefs of the parties and the amici do not present empirical 
evidence relevant to the Court’s formulation of new legal rules, the Court 
may seek out such information themselves.62 Researchers have studied this 
phenomenon with respect to federal and state appellate courts. One 
researcher documented anecdotal evidence that appellate courts often took 
judicial notice of legislative facts not provided by the parties.63 Another 
researcher noted that one-quarter of the legislative facts cited in appellate 
court opinions was provided by party counsel.64 Professor Margolis found 
that “[w]hile there are many legitimate questions about courts’ use of non-
legal materials, they do not negate the fact that courts are using, and will 
continue to use nonlegal information in support of decisions.”65 Given 
these circumstances, Margolis argued that parties would be remiss in 
failing to present legislative facts to the Court.66 These arguments apply 
more strongly to scientific and technical organizations in cases involving 
scientific and technical issues, because of both their familiarity with 
pertinent legislative facts in such cases, and their ability to achieve 
credibility as more neutral “friends of the court.” 
Even when Justices do not incorporate scientific facts accurately, or 
when Justices do not directly rely on empirical evidence, the presentation 
of such evidence may be necessary for the public to contextualize the 
Court’s decisions. In turn, increased public awareness provides 
independent restraints on judicial decision making by “establishing the 
grounds for debate and the boundaries beyond which the Court may not 
venture.”67 The Court can undermine its own legitimacy when it makes 
decisions that deviate too strongly from the public’s understanding of the 
issues because the public’s faith in the justice of the Court’s decisions is 
tied to its understanding of the issues.68 In a time full of increasing 
 
 
 62. See George R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to 
Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 39; Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative 
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 84; Margolis, supra note 9, at 202. Cf. 
Wendy E. Wagner, Ethyl: Bridging the Law-Science Divide, 74 T EX. L. REV. 1291 (1996) (approving 
of Judge Wright’s en banc opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), because of its 
rigorously analytical approach to “a complex socio-scientific challenge to the EPA’s lead standard for 
gasoline”). 
 63. See Currie, supra  note 62, at 44-49; see also  John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use 
of Social Science Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991). 
 64. See T HOMA S B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 174 (1978). 
 65. Margolis,  supra note 9, at  208. 
 66. Id. 
 67. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY : THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE AND LAW 114 
(1999). 
 68. See Condlin, supra  note 7, at 205 (“ [The] failure to incorporate science, accurately 
understood, into legal resolutions . . . undercuts the legitimacy of those resolutions.”); John M. Scheb 
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national acceptance of scientific and technical authority,69 the public’s 
awareness of scientific and technical research accordingly affects the 
judicial process. By explicitly rejecting or expressing disdain for empirical 
research, the Court may impair public trust in its decisions. For instance, 
the Court received widespread criticism for explicitly rejecting a 
comprehensive study indicating that defendants charged with killing white 
individuals were four times more likely to receive the death penalty than 
defendants charged with killing African Americans.70 Although the study 
did not appear to impact the Court’s holding, its presentation apprised the 
public of the Court’s willingness to uphold a death sentence despite 
indications of widespread systematic prejudice. Such notice provided the 
public with a more comprehensive and critical understanding of the nature 
of the Court’s decision. Generally, the Court’s rejection of such scientific 
studies also invites the public to openly challenge its decisions, legislators 
to revise challenged statutes to incorporate scientific understanding, and 
researchers to provide more studies to demonstrate the veracity of their 
positions. 
III. SCOPE OF EXAMINATION 
Scientific and technical organizations often participate as amici for the 
same reasons that many other amici participate: to ensure the legitimacy of 
the Court’s decision making, to ensure its accountability, to appeal to 
judicial reliance, to establish their own presence as legitimate political 
actors, and to promote their own professional interests. However, these 
organizations do not participate as amici in every case that implicates 
scientific or medical concerns. This Part examines the actual participation 
of such organizations and individuals before the Court during the past 
decade.71 
 
 
II & William Lyons, Public Perception of the Supreme Court in the 1990s, 82 JUDICATURE 66 (1998) 
(“Although the Supreme Court is ostensibly immune to the ebbs and flows of public opinion, most 
observers agree that it must enjoy a reasonable measure of public support or risk losing the legitimacy 
that undergirds its decisions.”); James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1040 (arguing that reliance by some Justices on public 
opinion has a viable historical basis, and that “public opinion ought to influence many constitutional 
decisions”) (emphasis added). 
 69. See Science and Truth , OFFSHORE , May 1998, at 8 (“The scientific research community 
consistently earns the highest public approval ratings of all groups in the US and Europe.”). 
 70. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); FAIGMAN, supra note 67, at 118 (noting that 
McCleskey met a barrage of criticism from academics, public interest groups, and the media, as well as 
a “flurry of proposals to reverse its effects through legislation introduced in chambers from Athens to 
Washington, D.C.”). 
 71. An assessment of the actual influential effect of scientific and technical amici is outside the 
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The scope of this examination includes all groups of individual 
scientists, doctors, and engineers as well as medical, scientific, and 
technical organizations who have submitted amicus curiae briefs to the 
Supreme Court. This Part’s examination of individuals and organizations 
from scientific disciplines is limited to those from the natural sciences and 
thus, does not include those from the social sciences. Medical and 
technical disciplines are included in this study because of their foundations 
in the natural sciences. Groups of “individual scientists, doctors, and 
engineers” includes all individuals with advanced degrees in either 
engineering, science, or medicine. Each group of named individuals was 
tallied as a single party for the purposes of counting. In addition, this 
examination limits its definition of “scientific or technical organizations” 
to organizations that both focus on a particular area in medicine, science, 
or engineering and claim to represent mainly individuals that fall under 
this paper’s definition of “doctors, scientists, and engineers.”72  
 
 
scope of this paper. For a recent comprehensive study  on the topic, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 
27. 
 72. This seemingly simple delineation of an organization as a “medical, scientific, or technical 
organization” is not without controversy. For instance, the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (AAAS), recognized as the nation’s largest scientific organization, acts as an umbrella 
organization for “more than 143,000 scientists, engineers, science educators, policymakers, and others 
dedicated to scientific and technological progress in service to society” and 285 “affiliated 
organizations.” AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, General Information, 
at http://www.aaas.org/aaas/geninfo.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000). These organizations, however, 
range from independent societies of scientists such as the Society for Integrative and Comparative 
Biology to more industry-based groups, such as the Poultry Science Association. See Miltenberg, 
supra  note 45, at 65-66 (arguing that even “neutral” scientific organizations such as the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science include members with strong commercial interests); 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, Affiliates,  at 
http://www.aaas.org/aaas/affil.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000) (providing links for all of AAAS’s 
affiliated organizations). Within the scope of this paper, however, the Society for Sedimentary 
Geology is considered a “medical, scientific, or technical organization” because it consists of members 
trained in a natural science and sedimentary geology, and is dedicated to advancing and disseminating 
information about a specific subject area—sedimentology, paleontology, and other related specialties. 
See Society for Sedimentary Geology, SEPM (Society for Sedimentary Geology), at 
http://www.sepm.org/sepm.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000) (Bylaws state that “SEPM, through its 
network of international members, is dedicated to the dissemination of scientific information on 
sedimentology, stratigraphy, paleontology, environmental sciences, marine geology, hydrogeology, 
and many additional related specialties.”). However, the Poultry Science Association is not considered 
a “medical, scientific, or technical organization” because the Poultry Science Association’s members 
consist of “administrators and producers” as well as scientists and its mission statement focuses on 
advancing a particular industry, rather than on advancing a particular area of science. See POULTRY 
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, Mission & Objectives, at http://www.psa.uiuc.edu/mission.html (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2000) (“The Poultry Science Association . . . is a professional organization consisting of 
approximately 3500 educators, scientists, extension specialists, administrators and producers who are 
committed to advancing the poultry industry.”). Similarly, the History of Science Society is not 
considered a “medical, scientific, or technical organization” because the history of science does not 
qualify as an area of science, engineering, or medicine, nor do the members generally have graduate 
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It is a difficult task to distinguish the particular disciplines that fall 
under this paper’s scope of “medicine, science, or engineering.” The line 
between natural sciences and social sciences is not always clear, and even 
the determination of what constitutes science is a point of contention.73 
Thus, this paper does not attempt to create a normative distinction between 
the natural sciences, the social sciences, engineering, and medicine. 
Indeed, under Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, such a distinction is not 
even legally relevant with respect to evidence.74 Rather, what constitutes 
“medicine, science, or engineering” within the scope of this paper is 
prescribed in a categorical, rather than a rule -based, manner. This Article 
therefore examines groups whose focal disciplines fall within these 
particular subdisciplines: mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, 
medicine (including psychiatry), and engineering. The study includes 
medical groups who primarily emphasize the treatment of patients through 
a particular subdiscipline and scientific or technical groups who primarily 
emphasize research in a particular subdiscipline of the natural sciences or 
technology. 
For the purposes of this examination, I collected medical, scientific, 
and technical amici briefs filed during the past ten terms of the Court, 
from the 1990-1991 term to February 2000 of the 1999-2000 term. In all, I 
found forty-four cases in which at least one organization or individual 
falling under this Article’s definition of “medical, scientific, or technical 
amici” participated. I then tabulated, created identifying key phrases,75 and 
briefed descriptions of the legal issues involved in each case. I also 
summarized the content of each amicus brief according to whether the 
brief focused on legal issues, scientific issues, or both, based on the 
content of the arguments themselves. Finally, I recorded certain
 
 
degrees in medicine, natural science, or engineering. See HISTORY OF SCIENCE SOCIETY, HSS: About 
the Society, at http://depts.washington.edu/hssexec/hss_description.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000).  
 73. See, e.g., DON K. PRICE , T HE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 122-23 (1965); WHAT IS SCIENCE? (James 
R. Newman ed., 1955); JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS 
FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE (1978). See also  Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations, in 
INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 19 (E. Klemke et al. eds., 1980) 
(distinguishing science from nonscience on the basis of falsifiability). 
 74. 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is no 
distinction between scientific knowledge and other technical or specialized types of knowledge). In 
particular, the Court noted that “[t]here is no clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines 
such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its 
development upon observation and properly engineered machinery.” Id. at 148. 
 75. Such key phrases include “ERISA cases,” “abortion case,” and “tort case.” 
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 characteristic factors about each amicus brief.76 These factors included the 
following characteristics: 
(1) the amicus’s general nature, whether in medicine, science, or 
engineering;  
(2) whether the amicus possessed a political mandate;77  
(3) whether the amicus was filing alone, or with other groups; 
(4) whether, in its statement of interest,78 the amicus represented 
itself as a “neutral” expert on a particular matter,79 or as a self-
interested representative of a professional group;  
(5) which party, if any, the amicus supported; 
(6) whether the outcome of that support was politically “liberal” or 
“conservative”;80 
 
 
 76. The types of characteristics chosen included those that were expected to have the most 
explanatory value for understanding the nature of amici participation. 
 77. The presence of a political mandate was determined by evaluating both the party’s self-
description within the amicus brief, and where available, the party’s mission statement on the world 
wide web. 
 78. See S. CT. R. 37.5 (requiring U.S. Supreme Court amicus briefs to contain a statement of 
“interest of the amicus curiae”). 
 79. Grouping amici based solely on self-interest or neutrality is not as facile as this paper’s 
simple two-category classification makes it seem. For instance, even organizations without a direct 
economic self-interest may have other interests such as self-promotion of a particular cause. See Mark 
R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1313, 
1327-36 (1999). However, in order to provide a simplified grouping for the amici, this paper relies on 
the statement of interest of each amici, recognizing potential vested interests in misrepresentation. For 
example, organizations may file amicus briefs in response to an “arms race conception of amicus 
participation.” Kearney & Merrill, supra  note 27, at 820-21. (“The great fear . . . may be that the Court 
will rule adversely to the organization’s interest . . . [and] may even cite an amicus brief filed in 
support of the other side[, leading organization members to] demand an explanation for why the group 
did not file its own brief to protect its interest.”). See also Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation 
During the Rehnquist Court Era , 9 J.L. & POL. 639, 675-76 (1993) (suggesting that interest groups 
may file amicus briefs for reasons of “organizational maintenance”). Some amici also profess to be 
participating as “neutral” amici in the sense of providing neutral qua scientific information but 
nevertheless acknowledged particular political interests. These amici were designated “experts with 
politics.” 
 80. Here, the distinction between politically liberal and politically conservative is drawn roughly 
according to the political typology of a 1999 political survey completed by the Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press. See T HE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, More About Us, at http://www.people-
press.org/moreabout.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2000). The Pew Research Center’s 1999 Typology 
divided voters into several groups. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, The Political Typology: Profiles of 
Typology Groups,  at http://www.people-press.org/typo99sec9.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000) 
[hereinafter “Pew Typology”]. The most conservative group, the “Staunch Conservatives,” had the 
defining values of “[p]ro-business, pro-military, pro-life, anti-gay and anti-social welfare with a strong 
faith in America.” They were also “anti-environmental. Self-defined patriot. Distrustful of 
government. Little concern for the poor. Unsupportive of the women’s movement.” Id. The “Liberal 
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(7) who prepared the brief; and 
(8) a characterization of the counsel on record for the brief as one of 
the following: an attorney at a private law firm, an attorney at an 
advocacy organization, the in-house counsel of an organization, a 
professor at a law school, or other. 
I also tallied factors (3)–(8) for every instance of amici participation by 
a particular organization or individual because such characteristic factors 
often differed on a case-by-case basis. In addition, each time a particular 
organization or individual signed on as an amici, I noted this as a separate 
instance of participation. All in all, this paper examined 163 separate 
instances of amici participation. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Characteristics of the Amici Themselves 
Appendix I lists all the medical, scientific, and technical organizations 
that have filed amicus briefs before the Supreme Court in the last ten 
terms, either alone or with other organizations. In all, a total of ninety-two 
separate amici participated. I ranked the amici first according to the 
number of filed briefs, and then alphabetically. Table 1 presents the 
categories of organizations that have participated, ranked by the number of 
organizations that fall into that category, from largest to smallest. 
 
 
Democrats” had the defining values of “[p]ro-choice and support civil rights, gay rights, and the 
environment. Very low expression of religious faith. Most sympathetic of any group to the poor, 
African-Americans and immigrants. Highly supportive of the women’s movement.” Id. These 
typology groups were treated as typical of “conservatives” and “liberals,” and whenever possible, the 
positions of the amici in the context of a particular case were grouped into these two categories. Under 
this typology, for instance, an amicus writing in support of a company in a mass tort suit would be 
characterized as “conservative,” while an amicus writing in support of the mass tort plaintiffs would be 
characterized as “liberal.” 
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Table 1. Categories of Organizations or Individuals Participating as 
Amici: 1990-1991 Term to February 2000 of 1999-2000 Term. 
Amici 
category 
Number of 
organizations 
or groups of 
individual 
amici 
Organizations or groups of individuals falling into this 
category 
Medicine 42 American Academy of Allergy and Immunology; 
American Academy of Dermatology ; American 
Academy of Family Physicians; American Association 
of Neurological Surgeons; American Academy of 
Neurology; American Academy of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons; American Academy of Pain Medicine; 
American Association for Respiratory Care; American 
Association of Addiction Medicine; American College 
of Cardiology; American College of Chest Physicians; 
American College of Emergency Physicians; American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; American 
College of Pain Medicine; American College of 
Physicians; American College of Preventative 
Medicine; American College of Radiology; American 
College of Surgeons; American Dental Association; 
American Medical Association; American Medical 
Student Association; American Medical Women’s 
Association; American Optometric Association; 
American Psychiatric Association; American Society of 
Anesthesiologists; American Society of Cataract and 
Refractive Surgery; American Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons; American Urological 
Association; Annals of Internal Medicine; Association 
of Reproductive Health Professionals; California 
Medical Association; College of American 
Pathologists; Congress of Neurological Surgeons; 
Illinois State Medical Society; Infections Diseases 
Society of America; Journal of the American Medical 
Association; New England Journal of Medicine; 
National Medical Association; San Francisco 
Psychoanalytic Institute; Society for General Internal 
Medicine; Union of American Physicians and Dentists; 
Washington State Psychiatric Association. 
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Individual 
or groups of 
individuals 
21 Harold Abelson, Ph.D. et al.; John Allen et al.; Bruce N. 
Ames, Ph.D. et al.; Stanley Aronowitz, Ph.D. et al.; 
Nicolas Ashford, Ph.D. et al.; John G. Bartlett, M.D. et 
al.; Ronald Bayer et al.; Howard B. Beckman, M.D. et 
al.; Nicolaas Bloembergen, Ph.D.; Stephen N. Bobo, et 
al.; George R. Caesar, M.D. et al.; John Cairns, Ph.D. et 
al.; Daryl E. Chubin, Ph.D. et al.; Devra Lee Davis, 
Ph.D. et al.; Joseph F. Donoghue, Ph.D. et al.; Alvan R. 
Feinstein, M.D.; Kenneth Heathington, Ph.D. et al.; 
Peter Orris, M.D. et al.; Kenneth Rothman, Ph.D. et al.; 
Julian M. Whitaker, M.D. et al.; six former surgeon 
generals. 
Science and 
engineering 
14 American Association for the Advancement of Science; 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists; 
Engineers and Scientists Guild, Lockheed Section; 
Federation of American Societies for Experimental 
Biology; Institute of Nautical Archeology; National 
Academy of Engineering; National Academy of 
Forensic Engineers; National Academy of Sciences; 
National Association of Academies of Science; National 
Society of Professional Engineers; Society for American 
Archeology; Society for California Archeology; Society 
for Historical Archaeology; Society of Professional 
Archeologists. 
Medical 
organization 
with 
political 
mandate 
8 American Association of Prolife Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists; American Association of Prolife 
Pediatricians; Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons; Doctors for Integrity in Policy Research; 
Doctors for Responsible Gun Ownership; Physicians for 
Human Rights; Physicians for Life; Physicians for 
Reproductive Health. 
Medical and 
legal hybrid 
organization 
3 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law; 
American College of Legal Medicine; American Society 
of Law, Medicine, and Ethics. 
Scientific 
organization 
with 
political 
mandate 
3 Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology; Center 
for Science in the Public Interest; Global Lawyers and 
Physicians. 
Medical and 
scientific 
organization 
with 
political 
mandate 
1 American Council on Science and Health 
Total 92  
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Medical organizations predominate the medical, scientific, or technical 
organizations and individuals that filed Supreme Court amicus briefs. Of 
the ninety-two amici, forty-two—close to half of the amici—are purely 
medical organizations, and another eleven are medical with a political 
mandate or medical and legal hybrid organizations. Almost all of the 
organizations that filed at least two amicus briefs in the last ten years are 
medical groups. The three most repeated players are the American 
Medical Association with sixteen briefs; the American Psychiatric 
Association with sixteen briefs; and the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists with eight briefs.  
The participation of medical, scientific, or technical amici appeared to 
be evenly distributed with respect to political ideology, with a slight 
leaning towards support for liberal outcomes.81 Of the 163 instances of 
participation, 85 instances can be categorized as liberal, 77 as 
conservative, and 1 as neither. Notably, more scientists and engineers than 
physicians and psychiatrists are present in the twenty-one instances in 
which groups of named individuals, as opposed to formal organizations, 
participated as amici on Supreme Court briefs. Ten of these groups of 
individuals are entirely composed of scientists or engineers, six of these 
are physicians or psychiatrists, and five of these are both. 
B. Cases in Which Medical, Scientific, or Engineering Amici Participated 
Appendix II summarizes all the cases in which at least one medical, 
scientific, or technical organization filed an amicus brief. A total of eighty-
one briefs were examined. All in all, medical, scientific, and technical 
amici participated in forty-six cases. The cases are first ranked by the 
number of filed medical, scientific, or technical amicus briefs, and then by 
the total number of participating medical, scientific, and technical amici. 
The types of cases in which medical, scientific, or technical amici 
participated are presented in Table 2. Tort cases involving the 
admissibility of expert testimony engendered the most participation with 
nineteen briefs, followed by abortion cases with eleven briefs, and right-
to-die cases with eight briefs. Only two medical, scientific, or technical 
amici participated in environmental cases. 
 
 
 81. See id. for definition of “political ideology,” “liberal,” and “conservative.”  
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Table 2. Types of Cases in Which Medical, Scientific, and Technical 
Amici Participated: 1990-1991 Term to February 2000 of the 1999-2000 
Term.82 
Type of case Number of 
amicus briefs 
filed by medical, 
scientific, or 
technical amici  
Total number of 
medical, 
scientific, or 
technical amici 
participating  
Number of cases 
with medical, 
scientific, or 
technical amici 
participation 
Tort 19 38 4 
Abortiona 11 27 6 
Right-to-die 8 18 2 
Disabilityb 6 9 2 
Tobaccoc 5 13 4 
Crime and mental 
illnessd 
6 6 5 
11th Amendment 
sovereign 
immunitye 
4 9 3 
ERISA 4 4 3 
Professional-
Client privilege 
3 5 2 
Environmental 2 2 2 
Medicare claims  1 10 1 
Health care 
management 
1 5 1 
Antitrust 1 4 1 
 
 
 82.  Footnotes (a-e) in Table 2 note the following information: 
 a. Includes cases regarding the regulation of abortion protesters as well as regulation 
of abortion itself. 
 b. Includes cases regarding the housing of the disabled and the interpretation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
 c.  Includes tobacco products liability cases.  
 d.  Includes cases on mentally ill and waiver of defendant’s rights; civil commitment 
proceedings for criminal defendants; and forced use of anti-psychotic medications.  
 e.  Includes qui tam cases. 
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Death penalty 1 3 1 
Gun control 1 2 1 
Alcohol labeling 1 1 1 
Census 1 1 1 
Gay rights 1 1 1 
Gender 
discrimination 
1 1 1 
Government 
contracts  
1 1 1 
Labor 1 1 1 
Medical 
monitoring 
1 1 1 
Patent 1 1 1 
Total 81 163 46 
 
The seven cases receiving the most briefs were in decreasing order: (1) 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, a tort case involving scientific 
evidence that had ten briefs filed by twenty-nine medical, scientific, or 
technical amici;83 (2) Rust v. Sullivan, an abortion case that had four briefs 
filed by ten medical amici;84 (3) Vacco v. Quill, a right-to-die case that had 
four briefs filed by nine medical, scientific, or technical amici;85 (4) 
Washington v. Glucksberg, another right-to-die case that had four briefs 
filed by nine medical, scientific, or technical amici;86 (5) Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael, a products liability tort case that had four briefs written by 
scientific amici;87 (6) Cipollone v. Liggett Group, a tobacco products 
liability case that had four briefs filed by four medical, scientific, or 
technical amici;88 and (7) General Electric Co. v. Joiner, a mass tort case 
involving scientific evidence that had four briefs filed by four medical, 
scientific, or technical amici.89 
 
 
 83. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 84. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 85. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 86. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 87. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 88. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 89. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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Consistent with the idea of science as a “neutral” discipline,90 fifty-two 
amici professed to be neutral experts. In twenty of the eighty-one briefs, 
amici acknowledged that pure economic and professional self-interest 
drove their participation. One amici admitted to having a mixture of self-
interest as well as a desire to provide a scientific context. Finally, eight 
amici stated that political interests motivated their participation. 
The briefs themselves contained a wide range of arguments. However, 
most amici utilized their expertise in their briefs by presenting scientific 
arguments. Twenty-three briefs provided a mixture of scientific and legal 
arguments; nineteen focused entirely on providing scientific facts and 
arguments; eighteen presented entirely legal arguments; eight included a 
mixture of legal and policy arguments; two involved a mixture of 
scientific and policy arguments; and one provided a policy argument. 
C. Generating the Briefs: When Advocacy Organizations Have Taken the 
Wheel 
In addition to examining the briefs and the amici, I also tallied the 
counsels of record to get a sense of the avenues through which medical, 
scientific, and technical organizations come to participate as amici. Some 
studies suggest that amicus filings are, in part, lawyer-driven.91 These 
numbers therefore may reflect how many advocacy groups actively 
solicited the participation of medical, scientific, and technical 
organizations and individuals. This may only be half the story though; it is 
also possible that medical, scientific, and technical organizations refused 
to join as parties even when advocacy groups solicited them. Without a 
direct poll of all of the advocacy groups involved, it is impossible to 
determine the frequency of this phenomenon. However, discussions with 
advocates suggest that it is rare for medical, scientific, and technical 
organizations to decline to participate, and that the degree of solicitation is 
a determinative factor of amici participation.92 
 
 
 90. See supra  note 44 and accompanying text.  
 91. See, e.g., T IMOTHY J. O’NEILL, BAKKE & THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: FRIENDS AND FOES IN 
THE CLASSROOM OF LITIGATION 218 (1985) (noting that in response to a survey, four-fifths of the 
amicus filers in Bakke answered that they came to participate through persuasion by the filing 
attorneys). But see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1112 (1988) (suggesting that despite the 
attraction to the prestige of Supreme Court litigation, groups scrut inize the costs of participation before 
actually filing as amici). 
 92. See Interview with John Echeverria, Counsel for National Audubon Society on the amicus 
brief in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), in Washington, D.C. (May 
22, 2000) (discussing his experience with Lucas and the experience of Patrick Parenteau, Counsel on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/3
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The examination of the counsels of record for the amici is presented in 
Table 3. Although most were from private law firms, a significant number 
were from advocacy organizations and educational institutions. Relatively 
few were counsels for the organizations themselves. 
Table 3. Number of Briefs for Medical, Scientific, and Technical 
Organizations as Sorted by Characteristics of the Counsel on Record. 
Counsel Number of amici briefs 
Private law firm 49 
Advocacy organization 17 
Practitioner from 
educational institution  
8 
Organizational in-house 
counsel 
6 
Solo 1 
Total 81 
 
The briefs where the counsels on record came from advocacy 
organizations and educational institutions advocated more liberal 
(seventeen briefs) than conservative (eight briefs) outcomes. Advocacy 
organizations that repeatedly played a role in filing briefs for medical, 
scientific, and technical amici include Public Citizen (liberal), Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (liberal), and various regional legal 
foundations (conservative).93 
V. DISCUSSION 
Two major findings emerge from this study. First, far more medical 
organizations (fifty-three) filed Supreme Court amicus briefs than 
scientific and technical organizations (seventeen). Second, almost none of 
the amici examined in this study—medical, scientific, or technical—
 
 
record for the scientific amicus brief in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859)). 
 93. For a definition of “liberal” and “conservative,” see supra  note 80 and accompanying text.  
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articipated as amici in environmental cases, even when the cases involved 
health and science concerns similar to those in cases where such amici did 
participate.  
A. Who Participates and Why? 
The most striking aspect of amici participation is the dominance of 
medical organizations as compared to scientific or technical organizations 
participating as amici. This imbalance is not due to a smaller number of 
scientific organizations; for example, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science alone consists of over 250 affiliate scientific 
organizations. There are several factors which could influence scientific or 
technical organizations’ less frequent amici participation, as compared to 
medical organizations’ amici participation in Supreme Court cases. Those 
possible factors are the following: the nature of the Supreme Court 
dockets; different levels of professional self-interest; differing professional 
cultures; and different levels of advocacy organizations’ familiarity with 
and solicitation of scientific and technical organizations.  
1. Nature of the Supreme Court Docket With a Special Emphasis on 
Environmental Cases 
The most compelling explanation for the disparity in participation 
between medical amici and scientific and technical amici is that there are 
fewer cases before the Court in which scientific information would be 
relevant as compared to medical information. For example, when the 
question of whether physician assisted-suicide should be a constitutionally 
protected right94 was before the Court, information in amicus briefs 
concerning the availability of pain-relieving technology arguably played a 
role in the Court’s inquiry as well as influenced the Court’s holding.95 In 
contrast, cases that implicate other areas of science, such as environmental 
cases, are often resolved on purely legal grounds.96 For example, the Court 
resolved purely on statutory interpretation grounds the question of whether 
 
 
 94. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 95. See Frederick R. Parker, Jr., Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill: An Analysis of 
the Amicus Curiae Briefs and the Supreme Court’s Majority and Concurring Opinions, 43 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 469, 536-37 (1999). See also  Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg & Quill Amicus Curiae 
Briefs: Verbatim Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (1997). 
 96. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the 
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 706 (2000) (stating that “[the current Supreme Court Justices] 
perceive environmental law . . . as merely an incidental factual context” for the resolution of a legal 
question”). 
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the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulated ash generated by 
the incineration of municipal solid waste.97 
This explanation, however, rests on the assumption that amici only 
participate when they believe their briefs will sway a case’s outcome.98 
There are, however, many instances in which medical amici have 
participated even though their participation may not significantly influence 
the Court’s legal determination. For example, when the Court considered 
the question of whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act preempts state law,99 amici presented medical information concerning 
the health effects of tobacco although such information was not 
particularly relevant to the issue of preemption.100 Due to the impact on 
public health that would result from the Court’s holding, however, three of 
the four medical and scientific amicus briefs in that case presented that 
very kind of medical information, despite the narrowness of the legal 
question presented.101 In addition, the occasional presence of amici in 
support of neither party102 indicates that amici may participate for reasons 
other than to persuade the Court to rule in favor of a particular petitioner 
or respondent. 
Further, it is possible that the absence of scientific amici, and even the 
absence of medical amici, in environmental cases exacerbates the Court’s 
failure to appreciate the nonlegal dimensions of its decisions in 
environmental cases.103 Medical organizations may believe that 
environmental advocacy groups already present information about health 
concerns and, as a result, decline to participate as amici.104 In Ohio 
Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, scientific organizations may have 
believed that either the challenged forestry association or the challenging 
environmental organizations presented adequate scientific information 
about a U.S. Forest Service plan’s effects on the ecosystem and 
 
 
 97. See City of Chicago v. Envtl. Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994).  
 98. See supra  text accompanying note 79. 
 99. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 100. See id. at 517 (“In our opinion, the pre-emptive scope of [the acts in question] is governed 
entirely by the express language in § 5 of each Act.”). 
 101. See Brief for the American Medical Association, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 
504 (1992) (No. 90-1038); Brief for Six Former Surgeons General, Cipollone (No. 90-1038); Brief for 
the American College of Chest Physicians, Cipollone (No. 90-1038). 
 102. See Brief for the New England Journal of Medicine, General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136 (1997) (No. 96-188). 
 103. See infra  Part V.B.1. 
 104. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Envtl. Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994) (challenging 
incinerator emissions operated by City of Chicago); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) 
(challenging EPA decision to allow Arkansas to discharge sewage treatment effluent into stream that 
would ultimately flow into Oklahoma). 
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consequently did not participate in the case.105  
The failure on the part of scientific organizations to participate is a 
mistake that needs to be rectified. The Court may be less likely to take 
judicial notice of the health and medical dimensions of an environmental 
case when litigants and advocacy organizations with environmental, or 
even “anti-environmental,” mandates are the sole presenters of such 
information. The presence of seemingly neutral parties such as scientific 
and medical organizations may make the Court more receptive to 
contextual information concerning environmental effects.106 
2. Professional Self-Interest 
Another contributing factor to the disparity between medical amici 
participation and scientific and technical amici participation may be a 
greater professional self-interest in the resolution of Supreme Court cases 
on the part of medical groups as compared to scientific and technical 
organizations. Decisions on abortion,107 disability,108 and right-to-die 
issues109 have a greater impact on the practice of medicine due to the 
heavy regulations imposed on medical professionals as a result of such 
decisions. Therefore, medical organizations may believe that by 
participating as amici, they have a chance to enhance their professional 
interests and practices.  
In contrast, within the scientific and technical communities, 
professional prestige may be diminished by participating as amici, with 
little economic gain to the actual profession.110 Further, judicial constraints 
 
 
 105. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998). 
 106. See discussion infra  Part V.B.1. 
 107. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (one medical amicus brief); Schenck v. 
Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (one medical amicus brief); Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994) (two medical amicus briefs); Nat’l Org. for 
Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (two medical amicus briefs); Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (one medical amicus brief); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (four 
medical amicus briefs).  
 108. See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (one medical amicus brief); 
Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (one medical amicus brief); 
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (one medical amicus brief); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 
(1998) (one medical amicus brief and one scientific amicus brief); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995) (one medical amicus brief).  
 109. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (four medical amicus briefs); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (four medical amicus briefs). 
 110. Cf. Andrew Lawler, Selling Science: At What Price?, 275 SCIENCE 296 (1997) (discussing 
dissent within the scientific community regarding whether or not members should participate in 
lobbying activities); Daniel Melnick et al., Participation of Biologists in the Formulation of National 
Science Policy, 35 FED’N PROC. 1957 (1975) (discussing the phenomenon where the more scientists 
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hinder the daily practice of science less than the daily practice of medicine 
because, while control of funding is the primary avenue for exerting 
political influence over basic scientific research, such control is rarely 
substantive.111 Even in scientific evidence cases where scientific and 
technical amici participated extensively as expert witnesses,112 the 
holdings had little effect on practicing scientists and engineers. 
Nevertheless, the significant presence of many scientific amici in these 
cases where they had little professional self-interest demonstrates that 
professional self-interest motives are not determinative of amici 
participation. Rather, amici in these cases may actually be motivated by 
the desire to educate the Court about aspects of science, especially in cases 
that implicate the procedural aspects of science.113 In a sense, this desire 
may constitute a broader form of self-interest—an interest in 
disseminating and enhancing the reputation of the scientific or technical 
discipline itself. 
Interestingly, scientific and technical organizations have failed to 
participate as amici in environmental cases where they arguably had 
professional self-interest. Cases involving a challenge to occupational 
safety and health standards,114 the imposition of fees on the disposal of 
hazardous waste,115 and a company’s failure to file hazardous waste and 
toxic chemicals reports according to statutory requirements116 directly 
affected chemical and waste disposal engineers’ professional practices. 
Yet none of these cases motivated professional organizations to participate 
as amici. Perhaps such professional self-interest was not enough to surpass 
other participatory barriers discussed in this section of the Article. 
 
 
participate in political matters, the less they were respected by colleagues). 
 111. See Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L.J. 
1341, 1352-64 (1987) (describing how little basic scientific research is governed politically and 
judicially). 
 112. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 113. See, e.g., Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993) (No. 92-102) (“We appear solely as individuals, on our own behalf, to inform the Court of 
our views as to the appropriate criteria for acceptable scientific evidence . . . .”); Brief for Daryl E. 
Chubin, Ph.D. et al., Daubert (No. 92-102) (“Amici seek to advise the Court that the decisions below 
were premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the peer review system, a misconception that has 
the potential of distorting both the way trials are conducted and the way in which the peer review 
system operates . . . . The need to understand these matters transcends the interests of the parties in this 
case and the unique perspectives of the amici might not otherwise be brought to the attention of the 
Court.”). 
 114. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
 115. See Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992).  
 116. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
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3. Professional Cultures 
The difference between medical amici participation and scientific and 
technical amici participation may also be explained by the different 
cultures of the professions.117 Because the medical community is already 
centered around working with human patients,118 physicians, psychiatrists, 
and other medical professionals may be more likely to participate in other 
societally centered matters such as legal proceedings. In contrast, 
becoming insulated from the rest of society may be critical to scientists’ 
initiation into the scientific community.119  
In addition, the medical community may be more likely to participate 
as amici in the Supreme Court because its members are already familiar 
with the judicial system through malpractice suits.120 In contrast, because 
scientists are more likely to be motivated either internally, through 
personal desire, or externally, through professional incentives—by the 
desire to discover, “there is little in their training, professional norms or 
work environment that gives them a sophisticated understanding of social 
value conflicts or equips them even to address such conflicts.”121 
However, the fact that more scientists and technical researchers than 
physicians participate as amici in their individual capacities suggests that 
the disparity between medical amici and scientific and technical amici 
participation cannot be entirely explained by differences between the 
medical community’s and the scientific community’s culture. Nor are 
scientists and engineers completely isolated from proceedings that affect 
society. Instead, scientists and engineers participate regularly in scientific 
advisory panels to assist agencies in setting standards.122 It is possible that 
 
 
 117. See Schuck, supra note 4, at 20 (acknowledging differences within particular scientifically 
trained communities, such as physicians, theoretical scientists, and experimental scientists).  
 118. See David T. Ozar, Malpractice and the Presuppositions of Medical Practice, 3 ANN. 
HEALTH L. 139, 139-40 (1994) (discussing cultural presuppositions of the medical community, such as 
“the medical profession’s fundamental commitment to the patient's good”). 
 119. See, e.g., T HOMAS S. KUHN, T HE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 164-65 (1970). 
 120. See Jonathan Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Healthcare Cost Containment: 
Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1315-18 (1994) (describing 
the effect of the malpractice doctrine on the culture of the medical community, and on the culture of 
society in general). 
 121. See Schuck, supra  note 4, at 17-18 (explaining some of the cultural biases of scientists that 
lead them to shun nonprofessional forums, “including courtrooms and legislative hearings”). 
 122.  See, e.g., Wagner, supra  note 16, at 214 n.124, 214-17 (listing various environmental 
statutes that require peer review of agency’s scientific assessments, as well as describing Congress’s 
commission of extensive scientific studies); Goldberg, supra  note 111, at 1365-70 (describing 
delegation of regulatory authority to administrative agencies in areas such as the environment). 
However, Professor Goldberg argues that even for regulatory issues that “combine scientific and 
policy matters . . . [courts] want to be sure that controversial policy decisions are made openly and 
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the differences in amici participation levels result from variations between 
the professional organizations of the different disciplines, rather than 
variations between the individuals within the disciplines. For example, 
because medical organizations already participate in Supreme Court cases 
directly affecting the profession of health care,123 institutional structures 
are already in place for them to participate in other types of legal 
proceedings.124  
4. Levels of Attorney Familiarity and Advocacy Group Solicitation 
Medical organizations may find it easier than scientific organizations to 
locate attorneys with appropriate backgrounds to translate their specialized 
concerns into legal arguments. Because health care and medicine are more 
heavily regulated than science, it seems reasonable for more lawyers to 
specialize in health care and medicine than in science and technology law. 
However, the section membership of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) tells a different story. The ABA Health Law Section—dedicated to 
increasing interest in the field of health law125—and the ABA Science and 
Technology Section—dedicated to increasing interest in science, 
technology, and the law126—have membership sizes that are too close to 
reflect the far more disparate numbers of medical versus scientific and 
technical organizations’ amici participation before the Supreme Court.127 
It is possible, however, that these membership statistics are not 
representative of the proportion of attorneys specializing in these areas of 
the law. For instance, many of the attorneys in the ABA Tort and 
Insurance Practice Section also have backgrounds in medicine.128 
 
 
persuasively, rather than under the guise of scientific neutrality.” Goldberg, supra , at 1367. 
In addition, the fact that scientific trade journals, for instance, the American Chemical Society’s 
Chemical & Engineering News, have regular columns on the law demonstrates that at least to some 
extent, these disciplines contextualize relevant legal matters.  
 123. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000) (questioning whether a physician, who 
performs clinical services for patients who are part of an ERISA plan, becomes a fiduciary to that 
plan); Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999) (presenting the question of whether the 
Federal Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act allows hospitals to screen individuals who come to 
hospital emergency rooms seeking assistance). 
 124. See infra  Part V.A.4. 
 125. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Health Law Section, at http://www.abanet.org/health/ 
about.html (last updated July 25, 2000). The Health Law Section has approximately 8900 members. Id. 
 126. See Email Interview with Alanna Sullivan, Assistant Manager for the Science and 
Technology Section of the American Bar Association (Apr. 24, 2000). The Science and Technology 
Section has approximately 6100 members. Id. 
 127. See supra  notes 125-26. 
 128. The ABA Tort and Insurance Practice Section contains committees with practices that focus 
on medical issues, such as the Health and Disability Insurance Law Committee, the Medicine and Law 
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Therefore, there may be far more lawyers with medical expertise than 
reflected in the membership of the ABA Health Law Section. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that attorneys with a background in health 
and medicine are more likely to practice appellate or Supreme Court 
litigation than those with backgrounds in science. Such a disparity could 
render it more likely that medical organizations are better able to find 
attorneys with the appropriate backgrounds to help them file Supreme 
Court amicus briefs. 
Another contributing factor to the difference between medical group 
amici participation and scientific and technical group amici participation 
may be advocacy organizations’ solicitation choices. For instance, out of 
seventeen briefs, counsel from advocacy groups wrote four scientific 
amicus briefs, eight medical, and five that were both scientific and 
medical. This suggests that advocacy groups might be predisposed 
towards soliciting medical organizations to file amicus briefs.129 One 
environmental advocate proposed that the failure of environmental 
organizations to solicit scientific amici “may reflect an oddity of the 
environmental culture,” in that environmental organizations think of 
themselves as part scientific and therefore as “perfectly capable and 
appropriate spokesperson[s] for the scientific viewpoint.”130 Consequently, 
lawyers from such advocacy groups would feel it less imperative to solicit 
scientific amici. 
In contrast to amicus briefs filed by advocacy groups, the seven briefs 
filed by lawyers at educational institutions, who are arguably also 
participating as advocates for particular political causes, were more evenly 
split: three scientific, three medical, and two that were medical and 
scientific. Because of the small sample size, the actual proportion of the 
split may have little significance. On the other hand, the even distribution 
may imply that the advocate-counsel affects the choice of amici 
participation more than the medical, scientific, or technical community’s 
particular professional characteristics. Regardless of whether an amicus 
 
 
Committee, and the Toxic Torts and Environmental Law Committee. See AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, The Health and Disability Insurance Committee of the Tort and Insurance Practice 
Sections, at http://www.abanet.org/tips/health/home.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000); AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, The Medicine and Law Committee of the Tort and Insurance Practice Section, at 
http://www.abanet.org/tips/medicine/home.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000); AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, The Toxic Torts and Environmental Law Committee of the Tort and Insurance Practice 
Section, at http://www.abanet.org/tips/toxic/home.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2000). 
 129. See supra  Part IV.C (addressing the role of outside attorneys in soliciting amici). 
 130. Email Interview with John Echeverria, Director of Environmental Policy Project at the 
Georgetown University Law Center (May 3, 2000). 
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would be represented by an attorney from an advocacy organization or an 
educational institution, it would face the same issues regarding its 
participation. The amicus must place its name on the front of the amicus 
curiae brief regardless of which organization represents it. Instead, 
attorneys may be driving the difference in amicus participation. Perhaps 
law professors, by virtue of their location at educational institutions, 
interact with an equal cross-section of scientists and physicians who are 
also located at these institutions and therefore, are as likely to solicit one 
type of amicus as the other.  
B. Absence of Medical, Scientific, and Technical Amici in Environmental 
Cases 
The relative absence of medical, scientific, and technical amici in 
environmental cases as compared to other kinds of cases involving 
medical, scientific, and technical knowledge comprises the second most 
striking aspect of this study. This absence is significant because general 
amici131 often participate in environmental cases before the Supreme Court 
and those cases often have similar levels of amici participation as other 
Supreme Court cases.132 
Some of the barriers to medical, scientific, and technical amici 
participation in environmental cases have already been mentioned—
namely, the belief that environmental advocacy groups already present 
relevant information to the Court, the differences in professional self-
interest between medical versus scientific and technical amici, the 
differences in professional cultures between medical versus scientific and 
technical amici, and the differences in the levels of advocacy group 
solicitation of medical versus scientific and technical amici. In addition, it 
may be that environmental cases naturally possess characteristics that 
generally discourage medical, scientific, and technical amici participation. 
Many of these environmental cases reach the Court in postures that 
arguably allow less room for the interjection of scientific matters. For 
instance, in the last decade, four environmental cases before the Supreme 
 
 
 131. The term “general amici” refers to nonscientific amici or any amici not considered medical, 
scientific, or technical in nature.  
 132. For instance, although there was an 82% amici participation level for cases generally before 
the Court in 1988-1989 term, the proportion of environmental cases with amici participation was 86% 
in the 1980s. Compare STERN , supra  note 18, at 564, with Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and 
Friends of the Court: Assessing the Impact of Interest Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases 
Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 192, app. B at 211, tbl.1 (1991). 
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Court involved questions of standing, ripeness, and mootness;133 four 
major environmental cases in the 1990s involved Commerce Clause 
challenges to waste regulations;134 and three involved Fifth Amendment 
takings challenges.135 Scientific groups might perceive these questions as 
constraints on the scope of the Court’s examination, leaving any potential 
scientific information regarding the environmental issues irrelevant to the 
case. 
1. The Necessity of Medical and Scientific Amici in Environmental 
Cases 
As discussed earlier, the inability to present a clear answer to the 
question presented does not, and should not, bar amici participation. For 
example, numerous medical amici participated in cases that addressed 
whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted 
state tort law,136 whether pregnant women must be referred beyond Title X 
facilities in order to receive prenatal care or abortion services,137 and 
whether the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has the statutory authority 
to regulate tobacco.138 In all of these disputes, medical amici focused on 
 
 
 133. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000) (discussing whether plaintiffs had 
standing in citizen suit and whether case was moot when challenged permit holder substantially 
complied with its permit and subsequently shut down its facility); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 
523 U.S. 726 (1998) (discussing whether challenge to forest service management plan case was ripe); 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (discussing whether citizen group had 
standing to seek redress for past injuries); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 
(discussing whether citizen group had standing to challenge Interior Department regulation 
interpreting the reach of the Endangered Species Act as not extending to the territory of foreign 
countries). 
 134. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (deciding Commerce 
Clause challenge to flow control ordinance requiring all of a certain type of waste to be generated 
within town); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality of the State of Or., 511 U.S. 93 
(1994) (resolving Commerce Clause challenge to state statute imposing higher surcharge for disposal 
of waste originating out of state); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) 
(adjudicating Commerce Clause challenge to fees on disposal of hazardous waste generated outside 
state); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) 
(resolving Commerce Clause challenge to state prohibition on private landfill operators from accepting 
solid waste not generated in county in which landfill was located). 
 135. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (resolving 
regulatory takings challenge to city’s proposal of increasingly strict conditions after rejection of five 
successive development plans); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (deciding regulatory 
takings challenge to city planning commission’s mandate on building permit); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (adjudicating regulatory takings challenge to restrictions on 
development of beachfront property).  
 136. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 137. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 138. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
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providing medical information concerning the medical and health 
implications of the case, rather than directly addressing the legal issues 
presented in the case. Without medical amici participation, the Court 
would not have been presented with a full discussion of the stakes 
involved in those cases. 
a. The Unique Perspectives of Medical and Scientific Amici: 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, a 
case involving statutory interpretation, is the only environmental case in 
this study where a scientific or technical group participated on an amicus 
brief without other nonscientific groups.139 Certain cases involving 
questions of statutory interpretation may provide more room for the 
interjection of medical and scientific concerns than other types of cases. In 
Sweet Home, the Court sought to determine the reasonableness of the 
Interior Department’s interpretation of the language of “harm” under the 
Endangered Species Act as including “significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.”140  
The scientific amicus brief—written by fourteen prominent scientists in 
fields ranging from biology to paleontology—illustrates a model brief for 
scientists and scientific organizations in other environmental cases.141 The 
brief specifically emphasized the biological impacts and implications of 
extinction, citing to peer-reviewed scientific journals such as Nature.142 
The brief also acknowledged the limitations of its writers: 
As scientists, amici do not normally engage in statutory 
construction. Rather, we try to understand and communicate, as best 
we can, the science that underlies endangered species conservation 
efforts. But when a legal interpretation like the one at issue before 
this Court has such devastating consequences for the objects of our 
profession, we feel compelled to speak.143 
 
 
 139. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 140. Id. at 690. 
 141. See Brief for John Cairns, Jr. et al., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859). 
 142. See id. at nn.15-16. 
 143. Brief for John Cairns, Jr. et al., Babbitt (No. 94-859). The amicus briefs of some of the 
scientific amici in Daubert contained similar limiting language. See, e.g., Brief for the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of Sciences, Daubert v. 
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Despite admitting to limitations in their knowledge of the law, the 
amici proceeded to apply a form of statutory interpretation in their brief.144 
It passionately described many indirect ways through which pesticides can 
cause severe injury to individual animals, ranging from the secondary 
pesticide poisoning of bald eagles to the disruption of the traditional 
nesting area of sea turtles.145 It elaborated on the nature of species 
viability.146 It cited to published works of studies conducted by one of the 
amici himself.147 Yet the brief is not written in the dry manner often 
caricaturized as essential to science, but in the passionate manner of 
individuals devoted to studying science and understanding nature.  
The ability to present environmental concerns from this perspective is 
unique to scientific amici, due to their focus on the physical world.148 In 
her discussion of the regulation, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the 
statutory language in Sweet Home clearly applies “to significant habitat 
modification that kills or physically injures animals which, because they 
are in a vulnerable breeding state, do not or cannot flee or defend 
themselves, or to environmental pollutants that cause an animal to suffer 
physical complications during gestation.”149 Although she did not cite to a 
particular brief, her examples are precisely those raised by the scientific 
 
 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102) (“Amici have filed this brief to explain 
those factors that are particularly relevant to the case pending before the Court and the way in which 
scientists apply them in the day-to-day practice of their profession. Although amici do not comment 
directly on the available evidence . . . .”); Brief for Professors Kenneth Rothman et al., Daubert (No. 
92-102) (“We are practicing scientists, not lawyers. We cannot and do not opine as to legal issues such 
as whether federal judges have the authority to supplement enacted rules for excluding evidence. 
Rather, we write to explain how the lower courts have misconstrued the role of epidemiology and its 
limits and scope in modern science.”). 
 144. Brief for John Cairns, Jr. et al., Babbitt (No. 94-859) (noting with respect to the Court of 
Appeals’ requirement that harm involve direct injury to an individual member of a species that “[t]here 
simply is no biological basis for such artificial requirements”). Rather than an “artificially” narrow 
definition of harm, these amici urged the Court to adopt a practical, but more expansive, interpretation 
that would encompass the injuries described in their brief. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. (citing EDWARD O. WILSON, T HE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 280 (1993)). 
 148. See Mark A. Tumeo, Understanding Between Scientists and Attorneys for Better Service to 
Business and Community, 46 FED. LAW, Aug. 1999, at 19 (“Scientists and engineers take facts 
(physical laws, laws of material behavior, biological principles, etc.) and use them like pieces of a 
puzzle to create the whole picture. The fundamental premise of this approach is that if you understand 
all the parts, you will arrive at the true and correct whole picture.”); see also Goldberg, supra note 111, 
at 1344 (“Many scientists do care greatly about the ultimate practical impact of their work, but that 
concern is often secondary to the fundamental search for knowledge.”); Goldberg, supra , at 1349 
(“Scientists looking for empirically verifiable truth have to believe there is some kind of order in their 
universe, whether it is expressible in traditional cause-and-effect terms or in probabilistic equations.”). 
 149. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995). 
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amicus brief.150  
Although the scientific amicus brief in Sweet Home presented 
information similar to that presented in briefs by nonscientific amici,151 it 
is possible that the affirmation of this information by scientists persuaded 
Justice O’Connor, who is not a traditional supporter of environmental 
claims,152 to concur with the majority’s expansive interpretation of the 
Endangered Species Act. Scientific information may otherwise be lost or 
ignored when presented by nonscientific advocacy groups and individuals, 
or even a mixture of scientific and nonscientific parties. For example, in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,153 where coastal scientists 
participated as named amici in conjunction with advocacy organizations 
such as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Court did not directly address 
the scientific information presented by the amici.154 There, the scientists’ 
“distinctive viewpoint probably got lost in the shuffle.”155 
b. The Presentation of the Distinct Elements of Environmental Law 
Scientific and technical amici may be the groups or individuals most 
able to educate the Court about what is “environmental about 
environmental law.”156 In his recent article examining the votes of 
Supreme Court Justices on environmental cases, Professor Lazarus argued 
that the Supreme Court’s poor reception to environmental advocates’ 
claims results from the Justices’ failure to appreciate “environmental law 
as a distinct area of the law.”157 Lazarus argues that environmental law 
constitutes a distinct area of the law because environmental injuries have 
six particular characteristics: (1) many injuries are irreversible, 
catastrophic, and continuing in nature; (2) the injuries are physically 
distant in nature; (3) the injuries are temporally distant in nature; (4) the 
 
 
 150. See Brief for John Cairns et al., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859). 
 151. See Brief for Friends of Animals, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859) (describing how habitat modification causes damage to 
various species of animals across the United States). 
 152. See Lazarus, supra note 96, at 729 (noting Justice O’Connor’s relatively low score on the 
Article’s Supreme Court “environmental scorecard”). 
 153. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 154. See Brief for Nueces County et al., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 
91-453) (presenting information on sea-level rise and coastal ocean processes and including six coastal 
scientists as named amici). 
 155. Email Interview with John Echeverria, supra  note 130. 
 156. Lazarus, supra  note 96, at 703. See also  J. William Furrell, The Ungreening of the Court, 9 
ENVTL. FORUM, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 12. 
 157. Lazarus,  supra  note 96, at 706. 
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risk assessment of each injury is uncertain; (5) the injuries may have 
multiple causes; and (6) the injuries are noneconomic and nonhuman in 
character.158 
All of these distinguishing features of environmental law and injuries 
touch on matters of science. Indeed, environmental science textbooks in 
their introductions often invoke similar features—physical distance, 
temporal distance, and multiple causation.159  
This is not to say that scientific findings alone should be used to 
determine the Court’s holdings in environmental cases. Science itself 
cannot and should not provide the value-judgments inherent in most 
environmental law questions.160 Science cannot and should not tell us how 
to value different species, different risks, and different environmental 
consequences. Further, scientific tools, such as risk assessment, may 
contain internal biases which neglect particularized health risks in poor 
communities and communities of color.161 
 
 
 158. See id. at 745-48. In particular, Professor Lazarus explains that many environmental injuries 
are “noneconomic” because there is often “no readily available market analogue” by which to 
calculate their costs. Id. at 748. Environmental injuries are “nonhuman” when they primarily affect 
animals or their habitat, even though such effects may ultimately lead to human injuries. See id. 
 159. See, e.g., CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER MODERN TECHNIQUES v 
(Sut Ahuja et al. eds., 1973) (stating that “[w]ith the rise in general awareness of the effects of trace 
chemicals in the environment on man’s health , it has been realized that traditional methods of analysis 
are often inadequate”) (emphasis added); ELDON D. ENGER & BRADLEY F. SMITH, ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCE : A STUDY OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS xi (4th ed. 1992) (“The concept of interrelatedness is 
central to the text; understanding this concept will enable students to grow in their capacity for 
intelligent environmental decision making.”) (emphasis added); KRISHNAN RAJESHWAR & JORGE G. 
IBANEZ, ENVIRONMENTAL ELECTROCHEMISTRY : FUNDAMENTALS AND APPLICATIONS IN POLLUTION 
ABATEMENT 1 (1997) (“Every day our atmosphere, water resources and soil are becoming 
contaminated with human-made pollutants at levels that are unnoticed, and thus far more 
environmentally potent in a cumulative sense. We understand fairly well the health hazards associated 
with the acute overdose of many chemicals, but the same cannot be said about the long-term 
consequences of chronic exposure to them.”) (emphasis added) ; AMOS TURK ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCE 7 (2d ed. 1978) (“[M]any environmental disruptions have a combined effect—they pollute 
now and they pose a future threat to global systems . . . . In such instances public policy is focused on 
the immediate pollution problem, but the overhanging uncertainties add a measure of anxiety, and 
perhaps urgency, to the public response.”) (emphasis added).  
 160. See Kathy Bunting, Risk Assessment and Environmental Justice: A Critique of the Current 
Legal Framework and Suggestions for the Future, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 135-37 (1995) (discussing 
how, although risk assessments use scientific methods to calculate risk, their determinations still 
include values and biases); Holly Doremus, Listing Decision Under the Endangered Species Act: Why 
Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH . U. L.Q. 1029 (1997) (arguing that environmental 
advocates should not rely on science to protect endangered species because science cannot answer 
many value-laden questions).  
 161. See Bunting, supra note 160, at 135-37; Brian D. Israel, An Environmental Justice Critique 
of Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 469 (1994); Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice 
Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103. Cf. Eileen Gay Jones, Risky 
Assessments: Uncertainties in Science and the Human Dimensions of Environmental Decision Making, 
22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1997) (describing how risk assessments should be 
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However, science can provide context for value-based decisions. 
Regular participation by medical, scientific, and technical amici as 
information providers may be necessary for the Court to acknowledge the 
environmental aspects of environmental cases even when the Court 
focuses its attention on legal grounds. Presentation of information by 
scientists may reach certain Justices in ways that presentations by 
environmental advocates do not and cannot.162 For instance, a study of the 
Court’s citation to amicus briefs in environmental cases from 1970 to 1988 
found that although amicus briefs were filed by several repeat-player 
environmental groups, those of the Wilderness Society were among the 
only ones to which the Court cited as having influence on its decisions.163 
One proferred explanation was the “reputation for reliability”164 of the 
Wilderness Society’s counsel, suggesting that the Court did not perceive 
the other repeat environmental advocacy groups’ amicus briefs as reliable. 
In contrast, the majority in Kumho Tire Co.,165 Joiner,166 and Daubert,167 
cited with approval several amicus briefs by scientific groups and 
individuals even though none were repeat players.168 This indicates that at 
least in certain contexts, the Court perceives scientific amici as more 
“reliable” than nonscientific amici. In fact, medical, scientific, and 
technical amici even inform the Court about the limitations of science by 
 
 
aligned with public participation processes). 
 162. Cf. Lazarus, supra  note 96, at 763-71 (arguing that personal experiences of the Justices may 
lead to some being less receptive to environmental claims than others). Professor Lazarus suggests that 
Justice Powell’s experience as “legal counsel for regulated industry in a private law firm” may have 
led him to be more wary of pollution claims, while Justice Kennedy’s experience as a resident of 
California—with its earthquakes and mudslides—may have enhanced his sensitivity to the detrimental 
effects of developing unsuitable lands. Id. at 765. In addition, he notes that “[e]ach [environmental 
case] presents the Justices with a story about the way in which laws affect the quality of life and an 
opportunity to try to tap into the Justices’ own backgrounds in the telling of that story.” Id. at 768-69. 
Scientific organizations can present yet another perspective through which to tap into the backgrounds 
of some of the Justices. Cf. supra Part V.B.1.a. discussion of Justice O’Connor. 
 163. See Hedman, supra  note 132, at 204-05. 
 164. Id. at 205 (citing Telephone Interview by Susan Hedman with James Moorman, Attorney for 
Wilderness Society et al. (Mar. 27, 1989)). 
 165. 526 U.S. at 148 (1999) (citing Brief for National Academy of Engineering and Brief for John 
Allen et al. (No. 97-1709)); id. at 150 (citing Brief for Stephen N. Bobo et al. and Brief for United 
States (No. 97-1709)); id. at 156 (citing Brief for National Academy of Forensic Engineers (No. 97-
1709)). 
 166. 522 U.S. at 148 (1997) (citing Brief for New England Journal of Medicine et al. (No. 96-
188)). 
 167. 509 U.S. at 590 (1993) (citing Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. and Brief for American 
Association for the Advancement of Science et al. (No. 92-102)); id. at 596 (citing Brief for Ronald 
Bayer et al. (No. 92-102)). 
 168. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 148 (citing Brief for Rubber Manufacturers Association 
(No. 97-1709)); Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148 (citing Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (No. 96-
188)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p789 Tai.doc  4/26/01   4:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
828 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:789 
 
 
 
 
presenting metascientific information. Moreover, in Kumho Tire Co.,169 
Joiner,170 and Daubert171 the Court found this type of metascientific 
information most useful when presented by scientific amici. Indeed, at 
least one environmental scholar argues that metascientific information is 
the type of information that is most lacking in environmental decision 
making today.172  
Even when they may not directly persuade the Court to rule for a 
particular party, scientific and technical organizations may help the Court 
contextualize the environmental effects of its holdings. For example, the 
participation of scientific amici in City of Chicago v. Environmental 
Defense Fund173 probably would not have had a direct effect on the 
Court’s holding. In this case the Court, in support of the Environmental 
Defense Fund, held that ash generated by the incineration of municipal 
solid waste was subject to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
regulations governing hazardous waste, however, despite the absence of 
scientific amici.174  
Had scientific amici participated, they might have provided valuable 
information concerning the health risks posed by the generated ash and the 
process of ash generation itself. Such scientific and technical amici 
participation could have influenced the Court to recognize in its opinion 
the risks posed by the changing nature of waste processing much in the 
same way that medical information about the dilation and extraction 
method allowed the Court to better understand the risks involved in the 
abortion procedure challenged in Stenberg v. Carhart.175 Or perhaps the 
Court would have acknowledged procedural limitations in evaluating 
unknown risks, much in the same way that scientific amici information on 
the nature of peer review and scientific discovery allowed the Court to 
directly examine the role of peer review in Daubert.176 Instead, Justice 
 
 
 169. 526 U.S. at 148 (1999). 
 170. 522 U.S. at 148, 149 (1997). 
 171. 509 U.S. at 590 (1993). 
 172. See Wagner, supra  note 16, at 193 (arguing that “[n]ot only must policy makers gather 
available positive knowledge, but they also must appreciate where this information leaves off and the 
various, scattered uncertainties begin”). Such appreciation of the limitations of science would not only 
be useful to the policymakers addressed by Professor Wagner, but to the Court as well. Without such 
appreciation, policymakers and the Court may overestimate the extent to which science can provide 
quantitative answers to questions such as the risks and benefits of particular activities. Nevertheless, 
Professor Wagner notes that “there is rarely a generally accessible discussion of scientific knowledge 
gaps in the literature.” Id.  
 173. 511 U.S. 328 (1994). 
 174. See id. 
 175. 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2612-13 (2000).  
 176. 509 U.S. 579. 
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Scalia’s opinion for the majority in City of Chicago makes no 
acknowledgement of the environmental context of the case.177 
Finally, participation by scientific and technical amici in environmental 
cases may slowly change the Court’s perception of environmental law. 
Professor Lazarus notes that “[t]he cumulative effect of multiple stories 
. . . can over time significantly affect the way Justices decide what cases to 
hear and how to decide the legal issues presented.”178 Such could be true 
for the participation of scientific amici in environmental cases. Scientists’ 
long-term presentation of environmental consequences could aid the Court 
in understanding the environmental elements of environmental law. Just as 
the Court relies on legal precedent, long-term amici participation in 
environmental cases will provide the Court with a history of scientific, 
medical, and technical knowledge on which it can rely. 
2. American Trucking Associations: The Opportunity For a Normative 
Change? 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari179 for American Trucking 
Associations v. EPA,180 it presented the scientific and medical 
communities with an important opportunity to participate as amici.181 
American Trucking involves the constitutionality of EPA standards 
regarding nonthreshold pollutants.182 Here, amici presentation of risk-
assessment data, as well as information about the process and nature of 
risk assessments, may aid the Court significantly in its full resolution of 
the case. Further, this case lacks some of the traditional barriers to 
scientific amici participation and contains affirmative reasons for scientific 
and medical organizations to file amicus briefs. The adjudication of 
American Trucking involves (to some extent) a statutory construction 
rather than a standing, Commerce Clause, or takings issue; its potential 
 
 
 177. 511 U.S. 328 (1994). See also Lazarus, supra  note 96, at 737 (criticizing Justice’s Scalia’s 
failure to acknowledge the environmental context of City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund). 
 178. Lazarus, supra  note 96, at 769. Professor Lazarus urges more effective advocacy before the 
Court through the careful presentation of stories including the “legal issues and facts of the individual 
cases brought to the Court’s attention.” Id. at 768. 
 179. 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257), cross-petition granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 
3566 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426).  
 180. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev. denied in part, granted in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (denying review with respect to issue of nondelegation), petition for cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 
3496 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257), cross-petition granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. May 30, 
2000) (No. 99-1426). 
 181. 175 F.3d at 1033-39.  
 182.  68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257), cross-petition granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 
3566 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426). 
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outcome could affect amici’s professional self-interests; the scientific 
community is familiar with the case’s legal issues; and the legal 
community is familiar with the case’s scientific issues. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that some members of the scientific and medical community 
have participated as amici. 
a. The D.C. Circuit Opinion and the Petitions for Certiorari 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that the 
EPA’s more stringent standards regarding nonthreshold pollutants, such as 
ozone and particulate matter, violated the nondelegation doctrine.183 In 
doing so, it stated that “[a]lthough the factors EPA uses in determining the 
degree of public health concern associated with different levels of ozone 
and [particulate matter] are reasonable, EPA appears to have articulated no 
‘intelligible principle’ to channel its application of these factors; nor is one 
apparent from the statute.”184 Thus, the court found that the EPA had 
construed Section 109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA)185 “so loosely as to 
render them unconstitutional delegations of legislative power.”186 
Section 109 of the CAA, under which the EPA set its National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for nonthreshold pollutants, 
states that the standard must be set at the level “requisite to protect the 
public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.”187 Section 109 
requirements apply to any revision of NAAQS as well.188 The pollutants at 
issue in American Trucking are nonthreshold pollutants which introduce 
the possibility of adverse health impacts at any exposure level above 
zero.189 In doing so, the court held that the EPA must explain the “degree 
of imperfection permitted” for nonthreshold pollutants in order to set the 
 
 
 183. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”). Under this doctrine, if 
Congress states no “intelligible principle” in vesting power to the executive, it violates Article I. See, 
e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
 184. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). 
 186. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1). 
 189. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,863 (July 
18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (identifying no level for ozone exposure at which the 
EPA could conclude that no “adverse” effects were likely to occur); National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Particulate Matter: Proposed Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638, 65,651 (Dec. 13, 1996) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (noting that the most important factor “influencing the uncertainty 
associated with risk estimates is whether or not a threshold concentration exists below which 
particulate matter associated health risks are not likely to occur”). 
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standard at any level other than zero.190 In doing so, the court found that 
the EPA failed to explain adequately why, if it had the grounds to move 
the ozone standard from 0.09 parts-per-million (ppm) to 0.08 ppm, it did 
not have equal grounds to move to 0.07 ppm or lower.191 
The court rejected the three justifications proffered by the EPA, as well 
as a justification, although not made by the EPA, commonly made to 
defend challenges to agency standards. First, the EPA argued that 
permanent and irreversible harms occurred above 0.08 ppm, and only 
transient and reversible harms occurred below that level.192 The court 
found such a distinction unclear in the EPA’s final rule for ozone.193 
Second, the EPA noted that it relied on the recommendations of the Clean 
Air Act Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), an independent 
advisory committee consisting of medical doctors, epidemiologists, 
toxicologists, and environmental scientists,194 when it established the 0.08 
ppm standard. The court dismissed the EPA’s reliance on CASAC, stating 
that whether the EPA acted under lawfully delegated authority was a legal 
question, not a scientific inquiry.195 Third, the EPA argued that it chose the 
0.08 ppm level rather than the 0.07 ppm level because in some areas of the 
country, natural background levels of ozone exceed 0.07 ppm, but not 0.08 
ppm.196 The court rejected this argument as well, questioning whether the 
EPA had actually “explicitly adopted” such a reading.197 Finally, the court 
dismissed an argument not made by the EPA in this case, but often raised 
in such standard-setting cases: that below a certain level, greater 
uncertainty exists.198 In doing so, the court stated that such a rationale, 
without a principle that “reveals how much uncertainty is too much,” 
would constitute standard setting without an intelligible principle.199 
The court also rejected an argument brought by the industry petitioners 
and some amici in support of the petitioners: namely that the EPA was 
required to consider cost in revising its standards.200 The court reiterated 
 
 
 190. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
 191. See id. at 1035. 
 192. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868. 
 193. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035; National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868. 
 194. CASAC was created pursuant to Section 109 of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2). 
 195. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036. 
 196. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,868 (July 
18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 197. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id.  
 200. See id. at 1040-41. 
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its earlier ruling in Lead Industries,201 holding that the CAA and its 
legislative history “[made] clear that economic considerations play no part 
in the promulgation of [NAAQS].”202 Therefore, the EPA was precluded 
from considering costs in implementing NAAQS standards. 
The Supreme Court granted the EPA’s petition for certiorari on May 
22, 2000.203 On May 30, 2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
cross-petition filed by the industry, to be heard “in tandem” with the 
underlying case.204 The industry cross-petition urged the Court to consider 
overturning Lead Industries and allow the EPA to use the relative costs of 
regulations to provide an “intelligible” rationale for its decision making.205 
b. The Rejection of the Use of Scientific Studies 
The D.C. Circuit Court’s ruling, though founded on the nondelegation 
doctrine, explicitly rejected the use of science as a guide to provide 
intelligible principles.206 Not only did the court dismiss the EPA’s reliance 
on peer-reviewed studies,207 it explicitly stated that “the question whether 
EPA acted pursuant to lawfully delegated authority is not a scientific 
one,”208 and ignored other relevant sections of the CAA, under which 
scientific knowledge is explicitly provided as a guiding criterion for 
standard setting.209  
 
 
 201. Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 202. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1040 (citing Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1148).  
 203. 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).  
 204. 68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426).  
 205. See American Trucking Associations v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cross petition for 
cert. filed for American Trucking Associations at 14-27, American Trucking Association v. Browner, 
68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (2000) (Nos. 99-1426, 99-1431, 99-1442). 
 206. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036. 
 207. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 
38,656 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); see also American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 
1060 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The EPA set  the annual standard for PM2.5 pollution at the lowest level 
where it had confidence that the epidemiological evidence (filtered through peer-reviewed, published 
studies) displayed a statistically significant relationship between air pollution and adverse public 
health effects.”) (emphasis added). 
 208. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036. 
 209. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (directing the EPA to base standards on criteria that “accurately 
reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects 
on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient 
air . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
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Further, the decision does not acknowledge the inherent scientific 
uncertainty and time constraints attendant to any study of health effects.210 
The existence of such limitations should be acknowledged in the 
application of a legal standard such as the nondelegation doctrine.211 For 
instance, at the time the EPA issued its new rules regarding particulate 
matter, it did not know the actual biological mechanism for the health 
problems allegedly caused by particulate matter. However, recent studies 
by researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health have been 
successful in identifying possible biological mechanisms linking 
particulate matter to human health dangers.212 Such continuous additions 
and revisions to the knowledge base are typical of risk assessment.213 The 
CAA recognizes this evolving nature of scientific contributions to risk 
assessment. For example, the CAA requires the EPA to base its standards 
 
 
 210. See Brief for Massachusetts and New Jersey, Browner v. American Trucking Associations, 
2000 WL 1010282 at *41-42 (No. 99-1257) (“Given the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry and 
effects, and mechanisms of effects, on human health and welfare, it would be quite impossible to 
devise in advance a catch-all, quantitative standard to govern all decisions setting NAAQS.”); cf. 
Lazarus, supra  note 96, at 759 (Environmental problems often “require a degree of ongoing revision 
and fine-tuning in light of changing and uncertain information that often resists the kind of sharp 
delineations between those who legislate and those who merely execute the laws. It is for this reason 
that long-moribund nondelegation issues have recently arisen in the environmental context.”). Some 
researchers attempt to study the uncertainty of risk values obtained through risk assessments. See Janet 
E. Kester et al., Human Health Risk Assessment, in KENNETH W. AYERS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCE AND T ECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK 37, 65-69 (1994). Such analyses, known as uncertainty 
analyses, nevertheless involve certain assumptions—such as “[c]hemical concentrations remain 
constant over the exposure period” and “[e]xposures remain constant over time”—that themselves may 
contain uncertainties. Kester, supra , at 66; see also  Janet E. Kester et al., Ecological Risk Assessment, 
in KENNETH W. AYERS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND T ECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK 75, 92-93 
(1994) (noting that uncertainty in estimates of ecological risk may be greater than those for human 
health risks). Such uncertainty analyses, while important for the characterizations of risk, should not be 
confused with the amount of scientific uncertainty involved. See Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, 
and the Management of Toxic Risks Through Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 271, 279-82 (1990). 
 211. See Brief for the Petitioner at *28, Browner (No. 99-1257) (“To hold EPA to the court’s 
novel demand for precision would restrict the agency’s ability to act on a precautionary basis in the 
face of scientific uncertainties, thereby potentially eroding the public health protection Congress 
intended NAAQS to afford.”).  
 212. See Pamela Najor, Air Pollution: Particulate Matter May Lead to Increased Probability of 
Heart Problems, Study Finds, DAILY ENV. REPT., Feb. 23, 2000, at A-8 (BNA 2000). The article 
describes a recent study by Dr. John Godleski and other researchers at the Harvard School of Public 
Health. See John Godleski et al., Mechanisms of Morbidity and Mortality from Exposure to Ambient 
Air Particles, Report No. 91, in  HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE RESEARCH REPORT, Feb. 18, 2000, at 
http://www.healtheffects.org/Pubs-recent.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2000). 
 213. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk-Assessment in 
Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1675 (1995) (“[Principles for risk assessment 
suggested by the author] are intended to provide a general policy framework for evaluating and 
reducing risks, while recognizing that risk analysis is an evolving process, and agencies must retain 
sufficient flexibility to incorporate scientific advances.”). 
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on criteria that “accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge.”214 
Nevertheless, the majority opinion in American Trucking interpreted any 
guiding principle that allows for such developments as inconsistent with 
the nondelegation doctrine. 
c. What Medical and Scientific Organizations Can Provide and 
Have Provided the Court  
American Trucking presented a significant opportunity for scientific 
and medical groups to provide information about risk assessment to the 
Court. Regardless of which party a group supported, its discussion of risk 
assessment would have informed the Court about the context behind the 
nondelegation doctrine issue215 both by helping the Court determine what 
is “requisite to protect the human health” and what constitutes an 
“adequate margin of safety.”216 Further, such information would have been 
beneficial not only to the Court’s resolution of the nondelegation issue, but 
also of the cost-benefit issue, because the calculations of costs and benefits 
themselves rest on individual scientific determinations of risk.217 Finally, 
comprehensive discussions about risk assessment would also have helped 
the Court resolve whether any limiting factor for the regulation of 
nonthreshold pollutants should be drawn from the language of “requisite” 
and “adequate.”  
Medical, scientific, and technical organizations and individuals were 
well-positioned to present information to the Court about specific risk 
factors, the methodology of risk assessment,218 and the uncertainties 
 
 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 215. See Gaines, supra  note 210, at 273 (“[T]he paralysis of toxics regulation has a more complex 
etiology that begins with a synergy between the scientific and legal uncertainties. When the science 
cannot provide a conclusive description of the problem (or the proposed solution), it becomes 
philosophically impossible to formulate a definitive statement of the legal objective.”); Ashley C. 
Schannauer, Science and Policy in Risk Assessments: The Need for Effective Public Participation, 24 
VT. L. REV. 31 (1999) (discussing uncertainties in risk assessment and their effects on environmental 
law and policy).  
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 217. See Wagner, supra  note 16, at 209 (discussing risk assessment as the first step in agency 
cost-benefit analysis); id. at 209 n.109 (citing Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic 
Analysis: Benefits, Costs, Implications,  in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY 
IMPACT 455, 465 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997)). Professor Wagner argues that where scientific 
uncertainties are large, cost -benefit analyses can be useless. Id. Again, this demonstrates the need for 
presentation of information about uncertainties of the risk assessments involved in this case.  
 218. Cf. Brief for the Petitioners at *10 n.10, Browner (No. 99-1257) (“Epidemiologists look for 
statistical associations that may reflect cause-and-effect relationships, using the concept of statistical 
significance to separate those associations from results that may be the product of chance.”). An 
amicus brief by epidemiologists could have elaborated on this methodology to an extent that the 
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involved with risk assessment. Indeed, one group of lawyers and 
scientists219 and one medical organization with a professional mandate220 
filed amici briefs in support of the industry, while another medical 
organization with a political mandate filed an amicus brief in support of 
the EPA.221 These briefs contained similar characteristics to those in other 
“typical” scientific amicus briefs examined in this Article. 
The individual lawyers and scientists who filed an amicus brief, Gary 
E. Marchant et al., described themselves as “professors and scientists with 
scholarly or professional interests in the intersection of law and science” 
and expressed their “interest in seeing that the Court is informed on the 
appropriate use and limitations of science in setting national ambient air 
quality standards under the Clean Air Act.”222 Their brief explained the 
problems involved with relying purely on science to set health standards. 
First, the lawyers and scientists argued that science is inherently unable to 
perform the prescriptive, rather than descriptive, functions involved with 
standard-setting, by providing a detailed comparison between scientific 
inquiry, risk assessment, and risk management.223 The amici then 
suggested that the EPA was using science as a “charade,”224 because 
“science alone cannot provide a consistent and principled basis for 
[EPA’s] standard setting.” Finally, they concluded that, because science is 
unable to perform the prescriptive task alone, the EPA should use other 
criteria such as acceptable risks, costs, risk-risk tradeoffs, and equity to set 
the pollutant standards.225 It is interesting to note that amici participation 
in this case is strikingly similar to amici participation in Daubert, where 
amici questioned the use of science as the sole principle for decision 
making.226 
 
 
parties themselves could not, due to inadequate expertise and space limitations.   
 219. See Brief for Gary E. Marchant et al., Browner (No. 99-1426).  
 220. See Brief for American of American Physicians and Surgeons, Browner (No. 99-1426). 
 221. See Brief for Environmental Defense et al., Browner (No. 99-1426). One of the groups 
joining Environmental Defense on this brief was Physicians for Social Responsibility. 
 222. Brief for Gary E. Marchant et al., at *1, Browner (No. 99-1426).  
 223. See id. at *5. 
 224. Id. at *8-10. Marchant et al. draw the term Acharade@ from Professor Wagner=s article, The 
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, in which she argues that Aagencies exaggerate the 
contributions made by science in setting [environmental] standards in order to avoid accountability for 
underlying policy decisions.@ See Brief for Marchant et al., at *9, Browner (No. 99-1426) (citing 
Wagner, supra  note 16, at 1617).  
 225. See id. at 15-18.  
 226. There is irony in this situation because the scientific arguments in support of a particular side 
are reversed from those in Daubert. While in Daubert, amici who supported reliance on peer-reviewed 
studies were on the side of business interests, here, amici who critique the use of peer-reviewed studies 
are in support of business interests. See Brief for Marchant et al., at *10-15, Browner (No. 99-1426).  
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A medical organization with a professional mandate also filed an 
amicus brief in American Trucking.227 This organization, the American 
Association of Physicians and Surgeons, is “dedicated to defending the 
practice of private medicine.”228 It devoted most of its brief to discussing 
the history of the nondelegation doctrine,229 thus failing to take advantage 
of its medical expertise. Although it asserted that “scientific guidance does 
not provide policy guidance,” it did not base this assertion on any 
discussion of scientific methodology.230 It did, however, demonstrate the 
independence of its position from that of the industry by voicing its 
disagreement with the use of a cost-benefit analysis as an intelligible 
principle.231 The use of economic factors would, it argued, “expand[] the 
range of values factoring into EPA’s final decision,” rather than “guid[e] 
the balancing of those values.”232 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, another medical organization with 
a political mandate,233 joined with fifteen environmental and public health 
organizations to file an amicus brief in support of the EPA.234 The brief 
presented mostly legal, rather than medical, arguments, much like many 
other briefs in which a medical amici joined with several nonscientific 
amici.235 As with the American Association of Physicians and Surgeons, 
the Physicians for Social Responsibility failed to take advantage of its 
medical expertise, and in joining with so many other organizations, may 
even have lost its distinctive viewpoint in the shuffle.236 
The failure of the Physicians for Social Responsibility to present 
scientific and medical arguments in support of the EPA does not mean that 
no scientific arguments are available in defense of the EPA standards. 
Indeed, many scientific arguments were presented by both nonscientific 
amici as well as the parties themselves.237 Consequently, by failing to 
 
 
 227. See Brief for American of American Physicians and Surgeons, Browner (No. 99-1426).  
 228. Id. at *1.  
 229. See id. at *3-17.  
 230. See id. at *19-21.  
 231. See id. at *25-27.  
 232. Id. at *26.  
 233. See Physicians for Social Responsibility, About Physicians for Social Responsibility, at 
http://www.psr.org/aboutpsr.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2000) (stating that the Physicians for Social 
Responsibility are a group of physicians Aworking to create a world free of nuclear weapons, global 
environmental pollution, and gun violence@).  
 234. See Brief for Environmental Defense, et al., Browner (No. 99-1426).  
 235. See Email Interview with John Echeverria, supra  note 130. 
 236. See Brief for Environmental Defense et al., at *3-30, Browner (No. 99-1426) (discussing the 
congressional history of the Clean Air Act and rebutting the industry’s arguments for applying cost-
benefit analysis to standard setting). 
 237. See, e.g., Brief for American Lung Association at *1-12, Browner (No. 99-1257) (discussing 
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participate individually as amici, scientific and medical organizations and 
individuals who supported the EPA in this dispute lost a valuable 
opportunity to present this information from their own unique perspectives 
by taking advantage of their own expertise and credibility. Amici in 
support of the EPA standards could have explained the epidemiological 
studies upon which the EPA standards were based. Additionally, scientific 
and medical amici could have devoted their briefs to scientific arguments 
supporting the foundation of such standards on peer-reviewed studies. 
They could also have defended the soundness of relying on risk 
assessment to determine the “adequacy” of health protection. Moreover, 
they could have used the presentation of such information to argue that the 
EPA was indeed applying limiting factors to its standard-setting 
determinations for ozone and particulate matter. This information would 
have provided the Court with a fuller picture of the scientific issues at 
stake in this case. 
d. Incentives for Medical and Scientific Amici Participation 
As with Daubert,238 Joiner,239 and Kumho Tire Co.,240 medical and 
scientific organizations had strong incentives to participate as amici in 
American Trucking. Because the circuit court could be seen as rejecting peer-
reviewed science as irrelevant to its determination,241 a reversal of its 
decision by the Supreme Court could be seen as a vindication of the scientific 
and professional value of peer review in standard-setting.242 Further, because 
many scientists and epidemiologists work in areas that involve agency risk 
assessment, either as government-funded researchers or as outside 
consultants, the scientific and medical communities as a whole are quite 
 
 
the negative health effects of ozone and particulate matter and the studies relied upon by the EPA to 
establish its standards); Brief for California et al. at *23-24, Browner (No. 99-1257) (discussing the 
extensive scientific credentials of the members of CASAC and noting how Congress expressed no 
intent that any of those members be trained in economics); Brief for California et al., supra, at *25-31 
(discussing how cost-benefit analyses are as tied to science as risk assessments because costs decrease 
as scientific advances in technologies are made); Brief for the Federal Respondents at *8-12, Browner 
(No. 99-1257) (discussing the clinical studies considered by the EPA when making its determination to 
revise the particulate matter and ozone standards). Cf. Brief for the Cross-Petitioners, at *9-15, 
Browner (No. 99-1257) (critiquing the EPA’s scientific methodology in setting the revised ozone and 
PM standards). 
 238. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 239. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 240. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 241. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036. 
 242. Cf. 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), to support his statement that “CASAC provides an objective justification for the 
pollution standards the Agency selects”). 
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familiar with the issues presented in this case. Finally, because the case 
involves risk assessment—an area of science familiar to attorneys 
specializing in areas ranging from tort law to environmental law to public 
health law—medical and scientific organizations interested in amici 
participation would not have found it difficult to locate attorneys who could 
present their perspectives before the Court. Indeed, what is surprising is that 
even more scientific and medical organizations and individuals did not 
participate as amici in American Trucking. Perhaps, as suggested earlier in 
this Article, these organizations believe that scientific and medical 
information is being adequately presented to the Court by the parties already 
involved.243 But even when such information has been presented by 
nonscientific parties, as in American Trucking, the Court may not take notice 
of this information unless discussed by scientific and medical entities that do 
not purport to have political mandates. Consequently, these entities may have 
lost a valuable opportunity to advise the Court about scientific issues by 
failing to participate more extensively in this case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
All in all, there may be no hard and fast rules for predicting when 
medical, scientific, or technical organizations will participate as amici in 
Supreme Court cases, nor any strict normative rules for advising when 
such amici should participate. However, there appear to be two distinct 
trends in participation: the predominance of medical amici over scientific 
amici and the lack of medical and scientific amici in environmental cases. 
Notably, many environmental cases have characteristics similar to those in 
which medical organizations and individuals and even scientific and 
technical organizations and individuals have participated as amici. The 
presence of medical, scientific, and technical amici in environmental cases 
would be a welcome addition in aiding the Court to contextualize its legal 
decisions within the framework of environmental effects. In American 
Trucking, the presence of such amici may assist the Court in discerning 
intelligible principles from the EPA’s standard-setting procedures. More 
importantly, it may help remind the Court that the implications of its 
decision will stretch beyond the nondelegation doctrine and affect human 
health and the environment, thereby highlighting what is “environmental 
about environmental law.”244 
 
 
 243. See discussion supra  Part V.A.1. 
 244. Lazarus, supra  note 96, at 703.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/3
